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SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN

MitsuruMisawa *
I.

HISTORY OF POST-WAR JAPANESE SECURITIES MARKETS

Japanese securities exchanges, which were closed at the beginning
of the Allied Force occupation in 1945, were permitted to reopen in
1949. During the following two decades, the Japanese economy
displayed vigorous growth. An expansion of the operations of the
securities markets accompanied the expansion of the economy, but
the expansion did not progress evenly. The development of the
securities markets in the post-War period can be divided into a number
of stages: (1) the period of confusion and frustration (August 1945 to
August 1949); (2) the period of reorganization (May 1949 to January
1954); (3) the period of high growth (January 1954 to June 1961);
(4) the period of stagnation (July 1961 to January 1968); and (5) the
period of internationalization (January 1968 to the present).
A.

The Periodof Confusion and Frustration(1945-1949)

The defeat in World War II left the Japanese economy in a state of
near breakdown. Termination of the War disrupted the control
mechanism of the economy and for a while created a chaotic
condition. The rate of price increases was alarming.
In order to counteract the sharp spiraling of inflation, occupation
authorities (SCAP) 1 in 1946 directed the Japanese Government to
enforce emergency financial measures. One of these measures was the
issuance of a new currency, while old currency in excess of specified
amounts was frozen in "blocked" accounts. Since it was permissible to
use frozen funds to purchase corporate stocks,2 there was a notable
increase in securities transactions. These transactions were executed

*Economist and Legal Adviser, Industrial Bank of Japan (Tokyo). LL.B., 1960,
Tokyo University; LL.M., 1964, Harvard University; M.B.A., 1965, University of
Hawaii; Ph.D., 1967, University of Michigan. The author is most grateful to Dean
Robert L. Knauss, School of Law, Vanderbilt University, who provided excellent
advice and encouragement in the writing of this article. This article is part of a
project sponsored by the American Society of International Law.
1. SCAP is the official name of the occupation authorities, the General
Headquarters for the Supreme Commander for Allied Powers.
2. Ministry of Finance Notification No. 35 (Feb. 15, 1947) (Japan).
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only in over-the-counter markets by securities dealers, since the old
securities exchange system was dissolved after the surrender 3 and no
new organized exchanges had yet been created.
The notable reforms of the period were the "Zaibatsu a Dissolution" in 19451 and the adoption of the Securities Exchange Law in
1948.6 The measures directed against the Zaibatsu were some of the
most crucial changes sought by the occupation authorities. The
measures were directed, first, toward destroying the power and wealth
of the Zaibatsu, secondly, toward reducing each group to a number of
independent enterprises, and thirdly, toward encouraging competition
as a permanent condition of the economy.'
The enactment of the Securities Exchange Law was ordered by the
occupation authorities as a condition for the reopening of the
securities exchanges. This Law is a modified version of the United
States Securities Act of 19338 and of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.' Like the United States Acts, the Japanese Securities Exchange
Law requires an issuing company to make extensive disclosures to the
exchange and to the Government before issuing securities and
registering them on a stock exchange.
A provision borrowed from the United States that has exerted a
3. The securities exchange system in Japan was first established in 1878 when
the Tokyo and Osaka Stock Exchanges were inaugurated as joint stock companies.
This system endured for about 70 years until 1943, when the eight stock exchanges
in the key cities of Japan were merged into a semi-governmental Japanese Security
Exchange. For a discussion of the pre-War securities market see T. ADAMS,
JAPANESE SECURITIES MARKET 1-15

(Seikei Okuyama 1953).

4. Zaibatsu, which literally means the "money clique" or plutocracy, should
be translated as "large industrial and banking combinations." According to
Bisson's definition, it is a collective designation equivalent to the "wealthy
estate," which is customarily applied to the Japanese combines and to the persons
or families controlling them. For a discussion of the size and makeup of Zaibatsu
see T. BIsSON, ZAIBATSU DISSOLUTION IN JAPAN 1-32 (1954).
5. SCAP Memorandum (Nov. 6, 1945) (Japan).
6. Law No. 25 of 1948 (Japan). Subsequent amendments to the Law reflected
United States developments. Most recently the law was amended on March 3,
1971. Law No. 4 of 1971 (Japan).
7. For the legal base of the Zaibatsu dissolution see HOLDING COMPANY
LIQUIDATION
CERNING

COMMISSION,

LAWS,

THE RECONSTRUCTION

RULES
AND

AND

REGULATIONS

DEMOCRATIZATION

CON-

OF THE

(Jiyushobo 1947).
8. 15 U.S.C. § § 77a-77mm (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § § 77a-77mm

JAPANESE ECONOMY

(1970).
9. 15 U.S.C. § § 78a-78jj (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § § 78a-78hh(1)

(1970).
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considerable influence on the development of securities firms is that a
bank or a trust bank may not engage in the underwriting of
securities."0 Before World War II, underwriting in Japan was handled
by banks, trust companies and other financial institutions mostly
auxiliary to the Zaibatsu organization. The securities business was
concerned mainly with the current market, and underwriting was
accomplished, if at all, on a subcontract basis. Thus the prohibition
under the new law provided a significant contrast to the pre-War
custom.
In 1949, the occupation authorities issued a retraction of the
previous SCAP memorandum"' suspending securities exchanges; stock
exchanges in Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya were registered with the
Securities Transactions Commission and permitted to commence
trading sessions in May 1949. Stock exchanges opened in Kyoto,
Kobe, Hiroshima, Fukuoka and Niigata in July 1949, and the Sapporo
exchange began operation in May 1950.
In May 1949, just prior to the reopening of the exchanges, SCAP
established three basic rules for buying and selling securities:' 2 (1) all
transactions taking place at the exchange must be recorded in proper
sequence; (2) members of the stock exchange must, in transactions
involving listed stocks, do all trading on the exchange premises; and
(3) no forward trading would be permitted.1 3 These three principles
were designed to protect investors by eliminating excessive speculation
and unfair trading, and to facilitate the maintenance of fair stock
prices. The basic difference between the pre-War securities exchanges
and the new exchange was that the participants now became members
of a nonprofit membership organization (Shadan Hojin), instead of
being stockholders in a private organization.
B. The Period of Reorganization(1949-1953)
In February 1949, Mr. Joseph Dodge came to Japan as special
financial adviser to General MacArthur and made a crucial study of
Japanese economic conditions. A group of measures associated with
Mr. Dodge's visit came to be identified as the Dodge Line. One of the
purposes of these measures was to end inflation. Prior to the adoption

10. Securities Exchange Law art. 65 (1948) (Japan) [hereinafter cited as
Securities Exchange Law].
11. SCAP Memorandum (Sept. 25, 1945) (Japan).
12. SCAP Memorandum (April 1, 1949) (Japan).
13. In 1951, however, a form of credit transaction modeled after margin
transactions in the United States was introduced in the belief that speculation is
to some extent necessary for the stock market to play its role efficiently.
Vol. 6-No. 2
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of the Dodge Line, the Reconstruction Finance Bank (RFB) 14 had
been granting industrial loans, mainly for equipment, at a rate of over
10 billion yen (approximately 33 million dollars) per month. These
loans were thought to be one of the principal causes of inflation. As a
result of the Dodge Line measures, RFB lending ceased, and emphasis
was shifted to the accumulation of equity capital within business
enterprises to make them less dependent on government assistance for
industrial financing.
The occupation authorities used two means to encourage the
accumulation of equity capital within enterprises. One was a general
revaluation of assets introduced in 1950; the other was the Commercial Code"5 amendment of 1950. Under the asset revaluation
program, 6 the increase in capital that resulted from the increase in
book value of assets could be used only as a basis for stock dividends.
This prevented the increase from being used as a basis for cash
dividends and preserved the assets of corporations. At the same time,
the increased book value of assets led to higher annual depreciation
charges, which reduced the amount of cash earnings available for
future dividends and led to an internal generation of investment funds.
The final effects were that internal financing was increased, and the
market for shares was improved.
The Commercial Code in Japan had been transplanted from
Germany in 1899 as a part of the general acceptance of Western law
during the Meiji era.' 7 During the period of occupation, SCAP
reformed the Commercial Code, intending to adopt the Anglo-American approach to corporate law. The amendments to the Commercial
Code made in 1950 fall into three categories: (1) the rearrangement of

14. The Reconstruction Finance Bank was a quasi-banking institution
established in January 1947 by the Japanese Government to provide post-War
industrial funds. By 1949 almost all the key industries such as coal mining,
electric power and shipping relied entirely on this bank for funds.
15. Law No. 48 of 1899 (Japan).
16. In 1949 the United States dispatched the Shoup Tax Mission to Japan. In
close harmony with the Dodge Line, the Tax Mission made various recommendations concerning the basic revision of the Japanese tax system. The asset
revaluation was one of these recommendations. See generally T. ToKoYAMA,

PRESENTDAY

PUBLIC

FINANCE

AND TRENDS IN HISTORICAL

53 (The Science Council of Japan 1956).
17. Subsequent amendments to the Code in 1899,1911 and 1938 in the field
of corporation law mainly reflected German developments. See K. SHIDA,
DEVELOPMENT

NIHON

SH6HOTEN

JAPANESE

NO HENSAN

TO SONO

COMMERCIAL CODE AND

KAISEI (CODIFICATION OF

ITS AMENDMENTS)

(Meijidaigaku

Shuppanbu 1934).
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corporate powers among shareholders, the board of directors and the
corporate auditors; (2) the adoption of new ways of attracting capital
into the markets; and (3) the increasing of the rights of individual
shareholders. Although all three were significant in the subsequent
development of the securities markets, the second factor was the most
important. The concepts of authorized capital stock"8

value stock 9

and no-par

were borrowed from American practice to provide

flexibility in finance. Other introductions were redeemable stock,2
stock dividends, 2 stock split-ups22 and transfers from reserves to
stated capital.2"
During the first three to four years following the end of the War,
there was no formal bond market. In June 1949, the Bank of Japan
took steps to establish a limited market by agreeing to accept specified
bonds as collateral for loans to commercial banks.24 This step
apparently was successful in expanding the volume of new bond
issues, but the volume of bond trading remained relatively small, being
limited chiefly to a few individuals, brokers and financial institu25
tions.
C. The Periodof High Growth (1954-1961)
Japan's rate of economic growth increased very rapidly during the
period between 1954 and 1961. During these years the Gross National
Product grew at an annual rate of 9.9 per cent in real terms. 26 The
major factor in the expansion of the domestic market was increased
investment in equipment. The average annual growth rate of equipment investment reached 31.9 per cent in 1961.27
During the same period, stock quotations continued to advance at a
rapid pace. The per share price average in 1957 (first section prices)

18. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 166 (1899) (Japan) [herinafter cited as
COMMERCIAL CODE].

166,199.

19.

COMMERCIAL CODE arts.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

COMMERCIAL CODE art. 22.
COMMERCIAL CODE art.
COMMERCIAL CODE
DAIWA

MANUAL

25.

293(2).
293(4).
art. 293(3).

COMMERCIAL CODE art.

SECURITIES

Co.,

LTD.,

JAPAN

STOCK

EXCHANGE

259-61 (Tokyo Printing Co. 1963).

JAPAN PRODUCTIVITY CENTER, SECURITIES MARKET IN JAPAN

18 (Japan Productivity Center 1959).

26. See

THE ECONOMIC PLANNING

1964 NENBAN (NATIONAL
(Okurasho Insatsukyoku 1964).
27.Id.

HAKUSHO,

Vol. 6-No. 2

AGENCY,

KOKUMIN SHOTOKU

INCOME WHITE PAPER,

1964) 280

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LA W

was 471.53 and reached 1,829.7 in 1961-a 288 per cent increase.28
The turnover ratio 29 at the Tokyo Stock Exchange increased from
46.2 per cent in 1957 to 80.0 per cent in 1961.30
Another factor that favorably influenced the markets was stable
corporate dividends. During the period, the pay-out ratio3 1 remained
low so that enterprises could pay dividends with ease and make
investors feel safe. The low pay-out ratio also implied possibilities of
greater capital expansion in the future. Capital expansion was further
encouraged by rights offerings of new stocks to shareholders. In Japan
any new shares issued are offered at par regardless of the current
market price. This sizable underpricing encourages stock purchasing.
The establishment of the Second Section within the Tokyo Stock
Exchange in October 1961 stimulated companies to "go public." More
companies vied for the privilege of introducing their shares into the
market. An average of 33 companies per year went public in the
1958-1960 period; 156 companies introduced their stocks to the
market in 1961.32
Another factor favoring the expansion of the stock markets was the
growth of investment trust funds. The "Big Four"33 and ten smaller
securities firms established new investment trusts in rapid succession.
At the end of 1958, the outstanding capital of investment trust funds
reached 200 billion yen (approximately 667 million dollars) and
increased five-fold to 1,100 billion yen (approximately 3.667 billion
dollars) by the end of 1961. 34
In April 1956, bond trading markets were formally reopened in
Tokyo and Osaka, but the volume of trading remained small relative
to the volume of trading in the stock market. Although Japan was a

28. See TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, SHOKEN NENP6
STATISTICS REPORT) (Tokyo Stock Exchange 1961); id. (1957).

(ANNUAL

29. The turnover ratio is the ratio of the number of shares sold to the total

number of shares of listed stocks.
30. See TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, supra note 28.

31. The pay-out ratio is the ratio of the dividend per share to the profit per
share.
32. See

TOKYO

STOCK

EXCHANGE,

STATISTICS REPORT) ,Tokyo Stock

SH6KEN

NENPO

(ANNUAL

Exchange 1952).

33. The big four securities firms in Japan are Nomura, Yamaichi, Nikko and
Daiwa. These four companies account for about 60% of total sales of shares and

about 80% of the outstanding capital of investment trusts. See THE
EXCHANGES

OF THE

WORLD-THEIR

OPERATION,

PRINCIPAL

STRUCTURE

AND

DEVELOPMENT (D. Spray ed. 1964).
34. T6Y6 KEIZAI, SHOKEN SHIJU DOKUHON (SECURITIES MARKETS

MANUAL) 364 (Toy5 Keizaishinposha 1965).
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rapidly growing industrialized country with strong demands for
financial capital, it had achieved only a partially developed bond
market even in this period of high economic growth.
D.

The Period of Stagnation (1961-1967)

From July 1961 through 1967 the securities market experienced a
wide stock price decline and a notably long period of economic
lethargy.35 Throughout the period the daily volume of turnovers
declined steadily. By 1965, the daily volume of transactions had
decreased to the 1957 average. Moreover, the total number of shares
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange increased from 18 billion shares
to 1957 to 74 billion shares in 1965. Thus the scale of stock
36
transactions actually declined to one-fourth of the 1957 level.
As a result of these adverse market developments, efforts were
made to control new stock issues. There was fear that if the total value
of new issues was too large in proportion to the scale of the stock
market, it would cause the market to be depressed. In order to avoid
such undesirable results, the Capital Increase Coordinating Committee
was formed. The Committee is a voluntary organization composed of
representatives from the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, the
Tokyo Stock Exchange, the major securities firms and other financial
institutions.
If a listed company desires to increase its capital through the stock
market, the company is expected to notify the Committee of its
action. Although the Committee has no power to approve or
disapprove proposed issues, it may persuade the issuing company to
take such steps as delaying the issue. The activity of the Committee
37
has caused a decline in the number of new issues.

35. The First Section price average stood high at 1,829.74 in July 1961. Since
then it has moved continuously down to a low of 1,020.74 in July 1965-a
decline of 45%.

TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE,

STATISTICS REPORT)

SHOKEN

NENPO (ANNUAL

(Tokyo Stock Exchange 1965); id. (1961).

36. These statistics are compiled from THE INDUSTRIAL BANK OF
K5gin Chisa Gepp5 (Monthly Research Bulletin of the IndustrialBank of
Japan) 57 (The Industrial Bank of Japan, No. 123, 1966); THE INDUSTRIAL
BANK OF JAPAN, Kgin Chisa Geppi (Monthly Research Bulletin of the IndustrialBank of Japan) 100 (The Industrial Bank of Japan, No. 15, 1957).
37. As exceptional cases, new stock issues have been approved by the
Coordinating Committee through rigorous screening since that time. This
Committee is composed of the representatives from securities firms.
JAPAN,

Vol. 6-No. 2
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The protracted market slump also caused some deterioration in the
financial condition of securities companies. 3 To stabilize market
conditions and to restore normal stock market functions, a new
securities company, the Japan Joint Securities Company, was established in 1964 39 by the Industrial Bank of Japan, the Fuji Bank, the
Mitsubishi Bank and the four largest securities firms. Previously,
Japanese banks had purchased stocks in the open market for their own
accounts.4 0 The high risk involved, however, made such purchases
infeasible. The risk of investing in common stocks was reduced
through the new company, since individual bank purchases were
consolidated into a single channel and loans to the new firm were used
for the purchase of shares. The new firm, with an authorized capital of
32 million dollars and initial paid-in capital of 11 million dollars
concentrated on stock purchases in order to correct the supply and
demand imbalance in the market. The establishment of the Japan
Joint Securities Company and other related measures somewhat
improved the condition of the Japanese stock market. The market,
however, failed throughout this period to gain real strength and
restore its functions as efficiently as was required.
The bond market that was opened in 1956 suspended operations
in April 1962 due to a lack of trading.41 In January 1966 long-term
national bonds, the first of their kind since the War, were issued by
the Government.42 As a result of the flotation of national bonds, the
market for bonds and debentures was reopened officially in February
1966 on the nation's two major stock exchanges (Tokyo and

38. The deterioration of Yamaichi Securities Company (one of the big four
securities firms) was particularly acute. As a result, in 1964 the Ministry of
Finance and the Bank of Japan offered to make unlimited unsecured loans
through city banks to securities firms in financial difficulty. The financial
difficulties were relieved, however, by the Bank of Japan's provision of about 50
billion yen (approximately $0.17 billion) in mid-1965.
39. See Support from the Syndicate?, 210 Th EcONOMIST 1141 (1964).
40. In Japan, unlike the United States, banks and insurance companies may
acquire common shares for their accounts.
41. The only exception was the debentures issued by the Nippon Telegraph
and Telephone Public Corporation, which continued to be traded in the
exchanges.
42. Because the reckless issuance of national bonds during and after World
War 11 had invited inflation, Japanese law prohibited the issuance of national
bonds as revenue sources for government expenditures. Because of the pressure
centering on business, the need for stimulation from the governmental sector,
however, led to an amendment removing the prohibition on the issuance of
national bonds. Law No. 34 of 1947, The Public Finance Law, art. 4 (Japan). The
Spring, 1973
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Osaka).4" Issuance of the national bonds, however, failed to stimulate
the development of the bond market as anticipated; the market
remained inactive throughout this period."
E.

The Period of Internationalization(1967-)
Japan is now in the process of liberalizing capital transactions in
the wake of the Kennedy Round tariff negotiations held in Geneva in
May 1967. The liberalization program calls for expanding the range of
industries permitting foreign capital participation up to 50 per cent
and for increasing the ratios of stocks of Japanese enterprises subject
to acquisition by foreign investors by approval of the Bank of Japan.
As a result of this liberalized policy, investments in Japanese stocks by
foreign investors have been extremely brisk'since 1968. The attention
of overseas investors was encouraged by renewed growth in the
Japanese economy. Moreover, the international currency unrest based
on the pound sterling devaluation at the end of 1967 and the dollar
crises in early 1968 and 1973 combined to offer additional incentive
45
to foreign investment in Japanese stocks.

Between 1966 and the 1971 decline in the market there was
constant growth in new security issues (see Table 1). There were two
reasons for the decline in 1971. First, business generally was poor and
manufacturing industries were reluctant to invest in equipment
because of the uncertain future outlook. Secondly, since credit was
amount of issues for the 1965-66 fiscal year (April through March) was 989
billion yen (approximately $3.3 billion). See Treasury Bond Issue and Stock
Market, 34 THE ORIENTAL ECONOMIST 151 (1966).
43. The first issue of national bonds was listed on the two exchanges in
October 1966. Of the 4,500 public and private brands of bonds circulating in
Japan, only 30 brands of the top rating were listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange's bond section. Similarly, 25 brands were listed on that of the Osaka
Stock Exchange. The 30 varieties listed on the Tokyo Exchange consisted of one
municipal and four public corporation bonds, three special bank debentures and
22 industrial bonds. Nihon Keizai Shinbun (The Japan Economic Journal), Feb.
15, 1966, at 5.
44. Id. Nov. 8, 1966, at 3.
45. Also responsible for the increasing interest shown by foreign investors in
Japanese stocks was the reiatively low price earnings ratio, which in 1970 stood
at eleven to one as compared with twenty to one in the United States and sixteen

to one in West Germany. MINISTRY

OF FINANCE, SHOKEN KANKEI SIIUYO

CONCERNING
SECURITIES)
68
(6kurashi Shaken Kyoku 1973). In 1972, however, the price index for the First
Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange stood at a new high of 5,208 yen for the
old 225-issue price average. Id. at 65. Due to this rally, the average price earnings
ratio is no longer low.
SANKO

SHIRYOSHU
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TABLE 1*

Capital Increases and Issuance of Corporate
Bonds by Japanese Listed Companies, 1966-1971
(unit: 100 million yen)

CORPORATE BONDS

STOCKS
Without
With
Subscription Subscription
Total
Payments
Payments

1,925
2,527
3,227
5,280
6,594
5,410

1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
*Source:

MINISTRY

SHIRYOSHIU

2,145
2,643
3,526
5,522
7,110
5,941

220
116
299
242
516
531
OF

FINANCE,

(MATERIALS

Issuance

Net
Redemption Increase

4,159
5,498
4,952
4,951
6,083
8,535

2,268
3,502
2,139
2,241
3,132
3,130

SH5KEN

KANKEY

CONCERNING

SECURITIES)

1,891
1,996
2,813
2,710
2,951
5,405
SHUY5

SANK6

51, 85 (Okurashi

Sh5ken Kyoku 1973).
easy, they relied mainly on bank loans rather than capital increases.
The bond market has demonstrated dramatic growth in recent years,
but is still underdeveloped as a source of corporate capital.
In 1972, the Securities Exchange Law was amended to reflect
changes in the securities market that had taken place since the
enactment of the Law in 1953. The amendments aimed to incorporate
more fully the disclosure principle with the following results:
(1) during the waiting period, the registration statements have
become available to the public, and offers may be made
with a temporary prospectus;"
(2) instead of only issuers whose registrations have become
effective, all issuers whose securities are listed on the stock
exchanges or are traded in the over-the-counter markets are
now required to file securities reports with the Ministry of
Finance;4 7
(3) financial statements of an important subsidiary company
are required to be attached to the securities reports of the
parent company; 48
46. Securities Exchange Law art. 15.
47. Securities Exchange Law arts. 24, 25.
48. Securities Exchange Law arts. 23, 24.
Spring, 1973
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(4) companies whose accounting period is one year are
required to submit semiannual reports to the Ministry of
Finance;4 9 and
(5) all directors, accountants, engineers and underwriters
participating in an issue have become liable for misstatements or omissions in registration statements.5 0 These
persons were not liable before the amendments.

II. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS

In general the securities markets in Japan have been influenced by
three important factors: (1) an extremely high rate of saving by
individuals; (2) relatively little reliance on equity in corporation
finance; and (3) the absence of a developed bond market as a source
of capital.
A.

Saving Rate

The rate of Gross Domestic Saving compared to National Income in
the post-War period (1946-1971) has been around 38 per cent, and
that of Personal Saving compared to Disposable Personal Income has
been about 17 per cent."1 This ratio is much higher than that of the
United States and Western European countries.5 2 The high rate of
saving in Japan is even more striking in light of the low level of per
capita income throughout the long period of industrial development.
In 1970, official statistics indicated a per capita income level in Japan
of 1,536 dollars as compared with 3,886 dollars in the United

49. See note 47 supra
50. Securities Exchange Law art. 21.
MINISTRY OF FINANCE, supra note 45, at 13-14.
52. For the United States and Western European countries see Table 2 below:

51.

TABLE 2*

Savings Ratios in 1970
Personal Savings
Gross Domestic Savings X 100X10
Disposable Personal Income X 100
National Income
8.1%
18.5%

U.S.
U.K.

19.8%

8.2%

West Germany

28.4%

15.5%

France

28.2%

12.2%

*Source:

MINISTRY

SHIRYOSHUJ

Sh~ken Kyoku 1973).
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13, 14 (Okurash6
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States. 3 How, then, has Japan been able to achieve such a high
saving rate and supply the needed capital in spite of its lower
standard of living? No doubt there are many reasons. Some that may
be cited are the simplicity of Japanese living standards, the fact that
Japan lagged far behind most industrial countries in public provision
for social security and consumer services and the system of taxation,
in which the Government relies heavily on regressive taxes (except
personal and corporate income taxes)., 4 Another plausible explanation is that Japan imitated everything from the Western world except
consumption patterns, which remained intact owing to isolation from
this aspect of Western culture."5 We must also take into consideration
the virtues of thrift and austerity that are peculiar to Japan and stem
from tradition. In Japan that tradition embraces rigid, customary ways
of living too strongly entrenched to be changed by external forces
within a short period of time.
B.

CorporateDebt-Equity Ratio

The major problem with corporate financing in Japan arises not
from the inadequacy of the supply of funds but from the methods
customarily used by Japanese companies to acquire them. First, let us
compare typical capital structures of Japanese companies with those
of American firms. In Japan during the period from 1969 to 1971, the
equity ratio, i.e. the percentage of total assets attributable to equity
from retained earnings and common stockholder investment," was
17 per cent, a ratio substantially lower than the 54 per cent in the
United States (see Table 3).
The low equity ratio characteristic of Japanese companies results in
part from their inclination to finance growth by external funds-mainly bank loans. Japanese companies have resorted to external debt
financing rather than utilizing internally generated capital (reserves
and depreciation) or selling new common stock. In Japan reserves and
depreciation during the period 1969 to 1971 constituted 46 per cent
53. MINISTRY OF FINANCE, supra note 45, at 15.
54. W.

LOCKWOOD,

THE

ECONOMIC

GROWTH AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE

DEVELOPMENT

OF

JAPAN,

1868-1938, at 268-94 (1954).

55. Soviet Russia has been mentioned as another example of isolation. The
Iron Curtain was, according to one opinion, a necessary measure for the
maintenance of a high rate of savings and investment. See R. NURKSE,
PROBLEMS OF CAPITAL FORMATION IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

75 (1953).
56. In Japan preferred stock investment is not considered to be an equity
investment but a debt. Preferred stocks, however, are rarely used in Japan, so the
matter is not of great importance.
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TABLE 3*

Capital Structures of Non-Financial Major Companies and
Sources of Corporate Funds in Japan and the United States,
1969-1971
(unit: per cent)
JAPAN

Year

1969

1970

1971

U.S.

avg.

1969

1970

1971

avg.

Equity Ratio

18.0

17.3

16.6

17.3

55.0

53.9

53.8

54.2

Debt/Equity

454.5

478.0

503.4

478.6

88.3

94.9

105.8

96.3

(51.1)

(48.4)

(48.5)

(49.3)

(56.4)

(64.7)

(67.4)

3.6

3.7

2.6

3.3

3.6

6.4

11.2

7.0

Reserves

17.6

15.4

14.8

15.9

16.8

11.6

12.1

13.5

Depreciation

29.9

29.3

31.1

30.1

40.5

51.0

48.0

46.5

Others

-

-

-

-

-4.5

-4.3

-3.9

-4.2

Sources of CorporateFunds
Own Capital
Stocks

Borrowed Capital
Bonds
Bank Loans
Others

Total

(48.9)

(50.7)

(43.6)

(35.3)

(32.6)

(37.2)

1.3

1.5

2.4

1.7

10.2

19.2

16.2

15.2

39.6

42.6

41.3

41.2

9.2

1.1

2.8

4.4

8.0

7.5

7.8

7.8

24.2

15.0

13.6

17.6

100

(51.6)

100

(51.5)

(62.8)

100

*Source: Compiled and calculated from

100

100

100

100

100

MINISTRY OF FINANCE, SHOKEN

KANKEI SHUYO SANK6 SHIRYOSHJ (MATERIALS CONCERNING SECURI-

TIES)

33, 34, 43, 44 (Qkurash5 Sh6ken Kyoku 1973).

of total corporate funds, compared to 60 per cent for the same period
in the United States (see Table 3). Perhaps Japanese companies had no
alternative during the high growth period of the post-War economy
since they lacked sufficient opportunity to build up reserves and
depreciation. Capital surpluses of Japanese companies are also quite
low, partly because of par value stock offerings and partly because of
conservative asset revaluations.
In a survey made of 120 major companies in Japan,5 7 questions

57. The author sent a questionnaire to 120 Japanese companies for the
purpose of gaining insight into the attitude and position of Japanese companies on
the various problems that now face the Japanese securities market. The
distribution of this questionnaire was designed to cover all the main industries.
Replies were received from 62 companies (52% of the total).
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were asked concerning their financial decisions and their attitudes
toward the securities markets. When answering the question "What has
been the crucial reason for the low equity ratio?", 20 (33 per cent) of
the 58 companies responding placed the blame on the tax system; 14
companies (23 per cent) answered that it was due to the high cost of
stock issues, including the expensive financing custom of rights
offerings at par; 13 companies (22 per cent) believed that it resulted
from the underdevelopment of the stock markets; 3 companies (5 per
cent) thought it was due to the competitive behavior of banks.5 8
Some 41.2 per cent of total corporate funds obtained during the
1969-1971 period came from bank loans. This figure is considerably
greater than the 4.4 per cent obtained from this source in the same
period in the United States (see Table 3). Terms for securing long- and
short-term bank loans were liberal and the interest rates were low by
comparison to the terms and cost of equity capital and bond
borrowing. Bond issues provided about 1.7 per cent of the total
supply of corporate funds in Japan during the period as compared with
15.2 per cent in the United States.
In answer to the question whether it is desirable to improve the low
equity ratio in the capital structure, 54 (92 per cent) out of 58
companies answered "yes"; 1 company (2 per cent) answered
"desirable, but impossible"; and 3 companies (6 per cent) answered
"unnecessary." The companies that answered "unnecessary" stated
that Japanese companies could operate even under low equity ratios.
Of 54 companies that answered "yes," 27 companies (50 per cent)
stated that the ratio should be increased to afford protection against
business fluctuations. This concern about fluctuations in business
activity may stem from the financial difficulties that faced firms with
excessive loans during the 1964-1965 recession. Twenty companies
(37 per cent) stated that increased equity was desirable to augment
international competitiveness. With the liberalization of capital transactions, Japanese companies are recognizing the necessity of increasing
their international competitiveness.
Why has the Japanese stock market failed to perform the function
of guiding savings into corporate investment? Although there are
many answers to this question, one is the attitude of investors.
Financial institutions in Japan have been under such strict government

58. Of the companies that answered "others," some mentioned the too rapid
growth of the Japanese economy and others called attention to the substantial
loss of assets sustained by Japanese companies during the War. It is noteworthy
that 27 (45%) of the 58 companies directly or indirectly placed the blame on
stock market conditions.
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protection and supervision that most savers prefer to deposit their
funds in financial institutions.5 9 It can be argued that investor
protection under the Securities Exchange Law has not been as
effective as intended, and the public's preference for bank deposits has
been strengthened still further. More important perhaps is the attitude
of the companies, and here the cost of raising capital through the
stock market is of primary importance. The differences in the cost of
raising capital by various means have been significant; the reasons
relate to the tax situation as well as to the securities market. For
example, the cost of raising capital in the 1963-1972 period was 12.5
yen per 100 yen when stock was issued, 7.6 yen per 100 yen when
industrial bonds were issued, and 8.6 yen per 100 yen when funds
were borrowed from banks (see Table 4). If the cost of flotation and
TABLE

4*

Comparison of Financial Cost in Japan, 1963-1972
(unit: per cent)

Cost of Stocks
(Average
Dividends Rate)

Interest Rates
of Bank Loans
(Long-term
Average)

Interest Rates
on Bonds
(Industrial
Average)

1963

12.51

9.11

7.49

1964

12.51

9.01

7.48

1965

12.15

8.90

7.48

1966

11.83

8.70

7.49

1967

11.93

8.46

7.49

1968

12.17

8.40

7.56

1969

12.56

8.35

7.68

1970

13.10

8.41

8.02

1971

12.90

8.49

7.96

1972

13.11

8.42

7.44

AVG.

12.48

8.63

7.61

Year

*Source:

MINISTRY

SHIRYOSHU

OF

FINANCE,

SHOKEN

(MATERIALS CONCERNING

KANKEI

SECURITIES)

SHUY5

SANK5

7,8,69 (Okurash6

Shaken Kyoku 1973).

59. Certainly it is true that financial institutions buy and hold large amounts
of stocks but the percentage of their total resources so invested is too small to be
significant to depositors. Under the Anti-Trust Law, financial institutions cannot
buy or hold more than 10% of the outstanding stock of any company. See Law
No. 54 of 1941, Anti-Trust Law, art. 11 (Japan).
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the tax burden are taken into account, the total cost of raising capital
through issuance of stock becomes twice these figures. For many
companies these differences provided ample reasons for the decision
60
to borrow from banks rather than to issue stocks or bonds.
The problem, then, is how to reduce the cost of stock issues so that
dependence on stock issues as a source of capital can be augmented.
One solution might be to change the current tax system, which
accords a more favorable treatment to borrowing. Since it is
permissible for a business to deduct all interest payments under the
present tax system, the cost of borrowing is the annual interest rate.
This is about eight per cent at present. If funds are raised through
equity issues, a sixteen per cent return must be earned in order to pay
eight per cent dividends when the tax rate is 50 per cent. If it is
desirable to increase the equity ratio of Japanese companies, then it
would appear desirable to extend the preferential tax treatment of
interest payments to dividend payments; or, as an alternative, to
increase the tax rate on interest payments in the hands of recipients
and/or reduce the tax rate applicable to dividends paid to stockholders, thus making stock more attractive relative to borrowing.
Dividend policy is another important factor in determining the cost
of equity money. In this context, certain special features of Japanese
custom should be pointed out. In both Japan and the United States, a
declaration of dividends is based on business judgments of such factors
as the desirable amount of reinvestment of earnings, the size and
61
If
nature of earnings, the liquidity of assets and legal regulations.
current earnings are not sufficient to pay the customary dividend or if
liquid assets are not readily available, corporate management should
be able to decrease the dividend. But there is a special circumstance in
Japan that obligates corporate management to continue customary
dividends. This is the so-called "dividend cartel" system, which

60. In answer to the question, "What is your company's criteria for selecting
one source out of many sources of funds?," 43 companies (84%) replied "cost
considerations," 8 companies (16%) answered "availability considerations," and
2 companies (3%) answered "risk considerations." These answers indicate the degree to which Japanese companies are cost-minded in selecting their source of
funds.
61. Under the Japanese Commercial Code, a company must set aside as
earned surplus at least one-twentieth of the profit of each period until earned
surplus equals one-fourth of the stated capital. If this condition is satisfied, the
company is allowed to declare dividends whenever any excess of net assets exists
in addition to the sum of the stated capital and surplus. See COMMERCIAL
CODE arts. 288, 290.
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provides that the companies in the same industry should maintain the
same level of dividends. 2 For example, in the electric power
industry, all nine companies (Tokyo, Chiibu, Kansai, -Chligoku,
Hokuriku, T~hoku, Shikoku, Kyfishil and Hokkaido) have maintained
the same dividend rate not because they have identical profit margins,
but because of a tacit dividend cartel among them. This type of tacit
dividend cartel agreement is more or less characteristic of all Japanese
industries.63 When current earnings of a company do not warrant
such dividends as are required by the cartel, the company is compelled
to create profits by unsound accounting treatments such as reducing
reserves, selling unnecessary assets, changing the method of computing
depreciation or revaluing assets." Maintaining dividend payments by
such methods is not sound finance and actually deprives creditors of
protection. The remedy for this ill is the education of management
and perhaps the prescribing of accounting techniques for profit
reporting. Another important consideration in the cost of equity is the
traditional practice of companies to issue rights offerings at par
regardless of current market prices. This is discussed in greater detail
later.

C.

The Bond Market as a Source of Capital

We have already noted that the bond market in Japan is still
underdeveloped. Bond issues in Japan provide a relatively small
proportion of corporate funds compared with the United States,
providing about 1.7 per cent in recent years (see Table 3). Another
indicator of the underdevelopment of the bond market is the
relatively small number of companies that issue bonds. One hundred
and seventy public and private bonds are now listed on the Tokyo
Stock Exchange.6" As of January 1973 there were 239 companies

62. Professor Eiteman has pointed out that managers of Japanese companies

are dividend minded. See W. EITEMAN & D. EITEMAN, LEADING WORLD
STOCK EXCHANGES 61 (1964). They are, however, much too dividend minded
in this sense.
63. Other examples are banking institutions and railroads. See T. Hosoi,
HAITO SEISAKU (DIVIDEND POLICY) 103-96 (Moriyama Shten 1959).
64. For the details of this kind of accounting treatment see Y. AIDA,
KAIKEY KIGYO KESSAN NO URAM.A DA (MANIPULATION IN CORPORATE
ACCOUNTING)

65.

(Hakuto Shobo 1963).

MINISTRY OF FINANCE, supra note
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but this is a
that successfully had made public offerings of bonds,
very low percentage of the 1,606 listed companies and the 1,058,102
incorporated establishments existing in Japan at the end of 1971.61
Japanese commercial banks are the main purchasers and holders of
for bank debentures, relatively few bonds are owned by
bonds. Except
68
individuals.
Under present arrangements, the volume and terms of bond issues
are determined by two main groups: the trustees for flotation and the
large securities firms. Trustees for flotation are the banks that oversee

66. See Table 5 below:
TABLE 5*

Data for Companies Issuing Bonds
(As of January 1, 1973)
Rating

Yield (%)

No.

A Electric Power
A General

Maturity (yrs.)

9

6.984

10

16

6.984

10

20

7.027

10

150

7.070

10

B

20

7.185

10

Others

24

-

-

239

-

-

A
BB

Total

SH5KEN KANKEI SHUYO SANK6
SHIRYOSHUJ (MATERIALS CONCERNING SECURITIES) 82 (Okurash6 Sh6ken

*Source: MINISTRY OF FINANCE,
Kyokii 1973).

67. MINISTRY OF FINANCE. supra note 45, at 99. The bond issue that is
the most actively traded by the public is that of the Nippon Telegraph and
Telephone Public Corporation, which issues two kinds of debentures: fixedinterest bearing and discount debentures. In Japan, people are able to have a
telephone installed if they buy at least 150,000 yen ($500) worth of debentures.
As a rule they do not hold the bonds until maturity but sell them on the market.
This is the reason why the debentures are so actively traded on the market. The
bulk of the transactions of bonds are executed in the over-the-counter market. In
1972 almost 92% of bonds traded were traded in the over-the-counter market (see
Table 6 opposite).
68. Of total bonds outstanding, holdings by individuals at the end of 1967
amounted to only 8%, compared to 25% in the United States. MINISTRY OF
FINANCE, SHOKEN KANKEI SHUY6 SANK6 SHIRYOSHU (MATERIALS
CONCERNING SECURITIES) 119 (Okurash6 Sh6ken Kyoku 1969).
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the distribution of the securities and include commercial, trust and
long-term credit banks, of which the Industrial Bank of Japan is the
most important. The large securities firms69 are those that transact
the bulk of securities operations and serve as underwriters for bond
issues other than governmental issues.
Representatives from the trustees for flotation and from the
securities firms meet each month to decide on the volume and terms
of each issue for the coming month. The Government exercises
indirect control of the bond market at this meeting via the Industrial
Bank of Japan. Because of this control of the market a dual pricing
system has arisen with an administered price and an actual price.
The administered price is the price assigned under government
control at the time of issue. The price is not influenced by changes in
the money market unless there is a basic revision in the price and
terms at the time of issue. One exception is the price of discount
bonds, which increases constantly to its par at maturity. The actual
price is determined by supply and demand conditions in the market
and reflects conditions in money and capital markets. The actual price
is determined within a reasonable range of the administered price since
the negotiations between the brokerage firms and the customers

TABLE 6*

Trading of Public and Private Bonds
in Japan, 1968-1972
(unit: 100 million yen)

Trading in (a)
the Exchanges

Trading in the
Over-the-Counter
Market

Total

1968

1,099 (2.3%)

46,087 (97.7%)

47,186 (100%)

1969

1,853 (3.1%)

56,882 (96.9%)

58,735 (100%)

1970

2,585 (3.2%)

77,341 (96.8%)

79,926 (100%)

1971

5,235 (4.6%)

107,591 (95.4%)

112,826 (100%)

1972

13,414 (8.6%)

142,696 (91.4%)

156,110 (100%)

(a) includes all the exchanges in Japan.
*Source:

MINISTRY

SHIRYOSHTI

OF

(MATERIALS

FINANCE,

SHOKEN

CONCERNING

KANKEI

SECURITIES)

Sh6ken Kyoku 1973).
69. Nomura, Nikko, Yamaichi, Daiwa and Shinnihon.
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naturally take the administered price into consideration. As a result,
the actual price is not really orderly. This indirect government control
is said to be one of the reasons for the lack of a developed bond
market. One noteworthy problem that would arise in the event of the
liberalization of the bond market is the effect of the capital losses that
bond holders would have due to larger price fluctuations. Just as
American investors weathered a liberalization of the market in
United States government securities in 1951, however, it is expected
that Japanese investors would be able to do likewise. Furthermore, a
liberalization of the bond market would not destroy any real values
but would merely recognize actual values since bond prices at present
are artificial.
A second factor that has hindered active trading of bonds in the
market is the abnormal money rate system in Japan, which has led to
relatively higher rates of interest in the call money market."
Connected with this is the tendency of banks and other financial
institutions to hold bonds to maturity in order to avoid taking a
relatively large capital loss that might result from an attempt to sell in
an undeveloped market. Since the bonds can also serve as a source of
funds from the Bank of Japan, either through sale with a repurchase
contract or by serving as loan collateral, banks have little reason to sell
them before maturity and possibly incur a capital loss. If industrial
bonds were offered with a wider range of maturities, trading in bonds
would increase. Furthermore, greater flexibility in the maturities
tailored to investors' needs would make bonds more attractive to
investors. This might also affect the tendency of banks to hold bonds
to maturity. In a market where trading is active, banks would not be
in danger of suffering substantial losses on sale. Here, as in other
aspects of securities markets, investor behavior and inactive markets
are interrelated.
Another factor hindering active bond trading is the paucity of
information concerning their issuers. Since bonds are exempted from
the disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange Law, only
limited information is available to investors. This lack of information

70. In the period from 1957 to 1964, call loan rates had generally been higher
than the yield on private bonds. These relatively high yields in the call loan money
market had hindered the flow of money into the bond money market. The
unconditional call loan rate is supposedly subject to a maximum limit established
on a voluntary basis by the National Federation of Bankers' Association. CALL
MONEY ASSOCIATION,

THE CALL MONEY MARKET AND THE CALL

MONEY DEALER IN JAPAN 18 (Call Money Association 1963). This voluntary
call loan ceiling has been breached frequently and call loan rates have moved
substantially above bond yields.
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makes it difficult to compare alternative investments and discourages
investor interest. A final factor appears related to the dividend policy
for equity securities. The dividend cartel results in many equity
securities selling with a guaranteed annual return based on par. The
investor is thus protected with a minimum yield, yet stands to profit
through capital gains in a rising market.
HI.
A.

DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES

Types of SecuritiesAvailable on the Markets

During the occupation various new financing practices of AngloAmerican origin were introduced into the Japanese Commercial Code.
Before 1950, there were considerable differences in the types of
security instruments used to raise capital in Japan and in the United
States. The amendments of 1950, forced by the occupation authorities, had various aims. One was to introduce corporate democracy and
another was to introduce new methods of attracting capital investment. Until the Zaibatsu were dissolved, the capital needs of large
companies were almost entirely met by the issuance of shares either to
the banks of Zaibatsu or to Zaibatsu holding companies. With the
dissolution of the Zaibatsu and the separation of investment and
commercial banking, this financing structure was eliminated. Thus
substantial amounts of new capital could be raised only by appealing
to the general public, and it was felt that new and more efficient
financing methods on an open-market basis were a necessity.
An attempt was made to stimulate the use of new kinds of
securities. No-par stock 7 and redeemable stock7" were introduced.
Although practically unknown, revisions of the Japanese Commercial
Code in 1938 had provided for convertible securities,7 3 nonvoting
stock74 and preferred stock.7" Thus, legally, Japanese companies had
a variety of means with which to seek their new capital.
In contrast to the United States, where most shareholders' rights are
contractual, specific rights are provided in Japan in the Commercial
Code. Preferred shares enjoy a preference in the distribution of profits
as dividends and distribution of assets on liquidation.7 6 The articles of
incorporation usually provide that if a company decides to issue a new
class of shares a shareholder may demand the conversion of the shares
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL

Vol. 6-No. 2

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

arts. 186, 199.
art. 222.
arts. 222(2)-(7),
art. 242.

art. 222(1), (2).
art.

222.

341(2)-(5).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

he holds into shares of the new class." The conversion takes effect
when the demand is made, but the articles of incorporation may
provide that, for purposes of the distribution of profits, the
conversion shall be deemed to have been made on the last day of the
fiscal period in which the demand was made or on the last day of the
preceding fiscal period." Redeemable shares need not be, but in
practice usually are, preferred shares. When redeemable shares are
amortized, the total amount of stated capital is not decreased in
sequence. 79 Nonvoting shares have preferred status in the distribution
of profits."0 The articles of incorporation may provide that a holder
of shares having a preference with regard to the distribution of profits
shall not be entitled to vote as long as he receives the preferred
distribution, but under the Commercial Code the total number of
nonvoting shares may not exceed one-fourth of the total number of
issued shares.8 ' Shares with preferred voting rights may not be
provided even by the articles of incorporation. A company may issue
debentures convertible into shares in accordance with the provisions
of the articles or by a special resolution of a general meeting of
shareholders.8 2 A conversion into shares takes effect, as in the case of
convertible shares, when the demand for conversion is made.8 3 The
company may issue shares having par value or shares without par
value, or both, unless otherwise provided in the articles of incorpora4
8

tion.

In spite of the wide range of securities available, efforts to obtain
Japanese acceptance of various types of financing instruments of
Anglo-American origin have been unsuccessful. There are many
reasons why new financing methods of American origin, such as
no-par stock, redeemable stock and the like, have not been well
accepted in Japan. First, Japanese investors were not sufficiently
sophisticated to be willing to accept such a variety of corporate
financing instruments. Secondly, the new ideas were transplanted into
the Japanese environment too hastily and without the benefit of
general public discussion. Thirdly, the Commercial Code is deficient in
making some of the new methods workable. Also, the companies can
be called to account for their failure to educate investors properly.
77.
78.

CODE

art. 222(2).

CODE

art. 222(6).
art. 222.
art. 242.
art. 242.
art. 341(2).
art. 341(5).

80.
81.
82.
83.

COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL
COMMERCIAL

84.

COMMERCIAL CODE

79.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

art. 199.
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The initiative must be taken by companies. Unless the new instruments are actually offered for sale on the market, investors will never
be educated.
The cases of no-par stock and preferred stock illustrate the failure
of the Japanese community to accept new ideas. No-par stock was
introduced from American corporate law by the 1950 amendment to
the Commercial Code. The amendment permitted the board of
directors to determine the consideration that a company was to
receive for no-par stock; one-fourth of the consideration paid for such
stock was to be set aside as paid-in surplus.8" Only three companies
have issued no-par stock, one since 1962.86 No-par stock is considered
to be a strange species of financial instrument too hastily transplanted
to Japan by the occupation authorities who paid insufficient attention
to other related problems.8 7 One such problem is whether no-par
stock and par stock may be exchanged for each other.8 8 A second
stems from the opinion of the public that no-par stock is a device
available to aid companies to obtain equity capital when the market
prices of their stocks are at or below par.89 Accordingly, no-par is not
psychologically appealing to Japanese investors. Thirdly, Japanese
investors have been accustomed to stock that bears a face value
85. COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 280(2), 284(2). According to articles 288(2)
and 289, however, neither .paid-in surplus, revaluation surplus, reduction surplus,
nor other forms of capital surplus may be the source of dividends.
86. For the details of these cases see M. OKAMURA, KABUSHIKI KAISHA
KINYO NO KENKYU (STUDY OF CORPORATE FINANCE) 172 (Mineruba
Shobo 1962). Fuji Kank6 Company issued no-par stocks four times between 1952
and 1957 in order to obtain equipment funds. Mitsubishi Warehouse Company
issued no-par stocks in 1952 to its stockholders on the occasion of incorporating
some of the revaluation reserve into stated capital. In 1962, Sumitomo Metals
Company, one of the four large steel companies, issued no-par stock when it increased capital.
87. See, e.g., THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COUNCIL, 1960 nen 6 gatsu
22 nichi zuke Okurasho ni taisuru Repoto (The Report of June 22, 1960 to the
Ministry of Finance), in SH6JI HSMu KENKYU (LEGAL STUDIES IN
CORPORATE AFFAIRS) 2 (No. 181, 1960).

88. Although the Commercial Code provides that a company may have both
outstanding at the same time, it does not say anything regarding their

exchangeability. According to one jurist, they are not mutually convertible under

the present Commercial Code. This problem could be resolved, of course, by
adding a provision to the Commercial Code describing their exchangeability.
Yoshida, Mugakumen Kabushiki o Meguru Shomondai (Some Problems Surrounding No-Par Stock), in SH6JI HSMU KENKYU (LEGAL STUDIES IN
CORPORATE AFFAIRS) 2 (No. 81,1962).
89. M.
FINANCE)

OKAMURA,

KIGYO

KINYU

RON

152, 153 (Mineruba Shobo 1962).
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imprinted on the certificates as a basis for determining the approximate worth of their stock, and as a basis for determining dividends
since investors have been accustomed to having dividends expressed as
a percentage of par value.
Since preferred stock was permitted by the pre-1938 Commercial
Code, it is not a financing measure of pure American origin.
Occupation authorities expected, however, that preferred stock so
widely accepted in the United States would be equally utilized in
Japan if they encouraged its use. Notwithstanding these expectations,
the history of preferred stock has been unhappy. In the post-War
period, only fifteen companies have issued preferred stocks, and the
aggregate amount of their issuance is less than 60 million yen (about
200,000 dollars).9
Only one preferred issue is traded on an
exchange.9 1 There are at least three reasons why preferred stock has
not been well received. In the first place, preferred stocks have been
issued only by companies involved in some financial difficulty, such as
an inability to sell common stocks. This has made preferred stock
unappealing to Japanese investors. Secondly, under the so-called
dividend cartel, common stocks in Japan already have one of the main
characteristics inherent in preferred stock, since dividends on common
stock are often paid at a uniform rate regardless of earnings. Thus a
promise of a fixed dividend on a preferred stock does not offer
Japanese investors any privilege. Thirdly, a company may accomplish
the result of preferred shares by issuing two or more classes of shares
that may differ in respect to dividend preference, sharing additional
income and asset preference. 92 Each company must describe in its
articles of incorporation the characteristics of its stock and the
93
number of each class of issued shares.
90. Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Japan Economic Journal), April 30, 1966, at 11.
91. The stocks of the Osaka Port Development Company are traded on the
Second Section of the Osaka Stock Exchange. Id., April 14, 1967, at 7. This is
quite different from the situation in the United States where many companies
have both common stock and preferred stock outstanding. W. EITEMAN, C.
DICE

& D.

EITEMAN, THE STOCK MARKET

96 (4th ed. 1966).

222(1).
93. In the United States the convertible covenant has been a prominent
feature of stock financing since World War II. R. OSBORN, BUSINESS FINANCE.
92.

COMMERCIAL CODE art.

THE MANAGEMENT

APPROACH

330-31 (1965). Although the convertible

covenant is allowed under the Japanese law, it has not been used. COMMERCIAL
CODE art. 222(2)-(7). No convertible preferred stock has ever been issued in
Japan. Preferred stock without the voting privilege, or with the voting privilege
only when dividends have not been declared, may be issued in Japan if described
in the articles of incorporation, but this feature has not added to the popularity of

preferred stock.

COMMERCIAL CODE
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B. Methods of Financing
A major portion of new equity financing by Japanese companies is
by allotments to stockholders (see Table 7). "Par value offering to
stockholders," or as sometimes called "rights offering at par," is the
common financial practice in Japan. Under the Commercial Code the
directors may determine the issuing price of stock, although stockholders' approval is required if preemptive rights are to be granted to
persons other than stockholders. 94 Near market value offerings as

used in the United States, whether made to stockholders or to the

TABLE

7*

Allotments to Stockholders vs. Public Offering
in Japan and the United States, 1966-1971
(unit: 100 million yen for Japan and one
million dollars for the United States)
Allotments to
Stockholders

Public
Offering

Others

Total

JAPAN(a)
1966

3,610 (79.6%)

295 (6.5%)

630 (13.9%)

4,535 (100%)

1967

3,766 (80.9%)

249 (5.4%)

639 (13.7%)

4,654 (100%)

1968

4,793 (80.8%)

256 (4.3%)

881 (14.9%)

5,930 (100%)

1969
1970

7,508 (84.0%)
9,136 (83.7%)

393 (4.4%)
656 (6.0%)

1,033 (11.6%)
1,128 (10.3%)

8,934 (100%)
10,920 (100%)

1971

7,729 (81.1%)

419 (4.4%)

1,376 (14.5%)

9,524 (100%)

UNITED STATES
1966

1,187 (53.5%)

993 (44.8%)

38 (1.7%)

2,218 (100%)

1967

674 (45.4%)

793 (53.4%)

17 (1.2%)

1,484 (100%)

1968

729 (25.5%)

2,088 (73.2%)

37 (1.3%)

2,854 (100%)

1969

875 (14.7%)

5,025 (84.5%)

49 (0.8%)

5,949 (100%)

1970

1,273 (17.2%)

6,032 (81.7%)

78 (1.1%)

7,383 (100%)

1971

2,522 (22.8%)

8,529 (77.1%)

10 (0.1%)

11,061 (100%)

(a)Japanese data is for all incorporated establishments.
*Source:
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public, are also legally possible in Japan.9" Offering new stocks at par
value to stockholders, however, is the more common practice. Public
offerings that directly or indirectly solicit subscriptions for stocks at
near market value from "many unspecified persons" who lack
preemptive rights are seldom made. In the cases in which new stocks
have been offered to the public on a near market value basis, an
accompanying offer of a substantial par value offering to stockholders
also has been made." The prevailing practice in the United States is
to offer new shares at a price as close to market value as feasible, due
allowance being made for the possibility of a decline in market value.
This practice of offering shares at something less than full market
price is called "underpricing." It should be noted that rights offerings
in the United States are made on a basis of underpricing market value
whether the offer is to stockholders or to the public.
This financing custom of offering new shares to old stockholders at
par is one of the important factors that makes the cost of equity funds
very high in Japan. There are many reasons why this is done.
Companies fear that changing to some other basis might undermine
the stock price, and there is pressure from stockholders and from
securities firms to maintain the custom. The principal reason that
rights offerings at par are continued, however, is merely because it is
the custom. This fact suggests that it might not be too difficult to
convince companies to change if ample reason for change can be cited.
The difference between a rights offering to old shareholders and a
public offering of new shares is not the problem at issue. The real
problem is that companies selling shares at par instead of at near
market value are passing over the opportunity to maximize their
equity ratio with a minimum of dilution.
In an offering at near market price or at a premium the issuing
company receives more funds from the sale of fewer shares than when
an issue is sold at par. The issuer, therefore, improves its equity-capital
ratio with less dilution of the book value of the shares. Also, the
95. Use of this type of offering, "jika hakko" (market price offering), has
actually increased rapidly since 1970, and this tendency is expected to continue.
For instance, in 1970, 21 companies increased their capital in this way and the
total amount was 74 billion yen ($0.247 billion). See ToKYo STOCK
EXCHANGE, SH6KEN NENKAN, 1971 (SECURITIES YEAR BOOK, 1971)
25-26 (Tokyo Stock Exchange 1971).
96. "Indirectly" here indicates the situation in which undenvriters subscribe
to the stock from the issuing company and then resell to the public.
97. See Yamaichi Securities Company, Zjshi Keitai no Kaiko to Tenb5 (The
Past and Future of the Forms of Capital Increase), in SH5JI H5Mu KENKYU
(LEGAL STUDIES IN CORPORATE AFFAIRS)

2-35 (No. 253,1962).
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necessity of reducing dividends per share due to the increase in the
number of the shares is greatly lessened. With near market price
offerings, fewer shares are issued relative to the consideration received
so that the ensuing dividend burden is naturally less than when par
value offerings are made. Stock prices are affected by various factors
such as dividend rates compared to interest rates, corporate earning
power and expected growth rates. Nevertheless, rights offerings at par
make the Japanese stock market more volatile, and the introduction
into the Japanese market of market price offerings, or at least
premium offerings,9" would tend to reduce its volatile character.
Despite the demonstrated merits of near market value offerings,
business managers have some qualms about departing from rights
offerings at par, for the premium over par resulting from rights
offerings at par is a strong inducement for investors to buy the new
shares. It should be noted that stock splits, which are common in the
United States, are seldom used in Japan. If stock splits should become
popular in Japan, investors might view the new split shares as a
dividend in much the same manner as they are now inclined to view
the difference between the market price and the par offered by a
rights offering at par. Although in the long run the merits of market
price offerings certainly offset any disadvantage to stockholders, a
hasty and complete conversion from rights offerings at par to rights
offerings at near market price might be upsetting to Japanese
investors. 99
Although Japanese stockholders are guaranteed preemptive rights,
stockholders sometimes waive these rights and thereby free directors
to make a public offering. Public offerings of new stock issues in
Japan, however, are not large and are generally accompanied by a
rights offering at par to the stockholders. Public offerings in Japan are
used customarily only to obtain funds not forthcoming from the
round sale of shares to the existing stockholders. For example, assume
that a firm desires to raise ten million yen and that it has stock with
par value of nine million yen outstanding. A one-for-one offer to
stockholders would raise nine million yen and the company would
resort to a public offering to raise the additional one million yen.
98. The premium offering is a method of offering shares whose issuing price is
set somewhere between the market price and the par value.
99. As a compromise, the premium offerings widely used in West Germany
might now be introduced into Japan. It is said that premium offerings when first
introduced in West Germany caused much protest but that the number of
investors who now favor the practice has been increasing. THE PRINCIPAL
EXCHANGES
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DEVELOPMENT
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The crucial problem with any public offering in Japan is to avoid
offering the issue to a favored few on unreasonable terms. The object
of public offerings is, of course, to obtain as much money as possible
from the general public by setting the issuing price as close to the
market price as possible. The Commercial Code requires that the
issuing price be determined fairly. It provides that if a company issues
shares at a grossly unfair price, shareholders who claim a pecuniary
damage may demand suspension of the issue.' 00 Any person who, in
collusion with directors, subscribes for shares at a grossly unfair price
must pay to the company an amount equivalent to the difference
between the fair issue price and the price he paid.' 01 A director or
stockholder may bring an action for nullification of the
issuance of
0 2
new shares within six months of their date of issuance.1
What constitutes a fair price is a serious problem in making a public
offering. The questions concern the price, the standard by which it is
determined and the time as of which its fairness is evaluated. The
Japanese Commercial Code does not define fair price. There has been
only one case dealing with the question, and that represented an
extreme situation." 3 In the United States "fair market value" of
stock is usually defined as what willing purchasers pay to willing
sellers in an open market.10 4 The vagueness of the words indicates

100. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 280(10).

101. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 280(11).
102. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 280(15).
103. According to the Ginza Matsuya decision the fairness of the price must
be determined as of the date the price is determined by the directors, not as of the
payment date to the company by the underwriter nor the date the public
purchases from the underwriters. 4-2 Kakyu Minshu 253 (Tokyo, District Court,
Feb. 23, 1953) (No. 127). The Ginza Matsuya case represented an extreme
situation where the market price jumped from 260 yen on the date that the price
was fixed at 250 yen (4% discount) to 650 yen on the payment date. Also,
according to the Matsuya decision, directors and underwriters are not to be held
responsible for changes in market price that occur between the date the offering
price is fixed and the date the shares are paid.
The Ginza Matsuya case did not specify the standard by which a fair price is to
be determined. The average discount in public offerings in Japan is around 10%
but there have been exceptions that run as high as 20%, none of which have
invited attack as grossly unfair, and none of which have been nullified under the
Commercial Code. Court decisions in the United States are not clear as to what
constitutes fair market value.
104. Hazeltine Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 F.2d 513, 519 (3d Cir. 1937). For
a similar case see Housing Authority v. Title Guarantee Loan & Trust Co., 243
Ala. 157, 160, 8 So.2d 835, 837 (1942).
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why courts hesitate to interfere with the judgment of directors. The
guiding principle appears to be that the offering price of new shares
must be exercised for the benefit of the company and in the interests
of all of the stockholders. As a criterion, it may safely be said that an
offering of new stock to outsiders at a price substantially below
market would be presumptively unfair and that a price approximately
equal to the market price should be considered presumptively fair.
C. Investment Banking Functionsin Japan
Although various definitions of investment banking are possible, it
can be defined as the intermediary activities carried on by institutions
(such as securities firms and commercial banks) in the sale of new
securities. The new issues markets play a central role in facilitating
long-term external financing by companies and governmental units.
The institutions serving as investment bankers help to marshal and
allocate the country's resources from economic units with a surplus of
funds to units with the ability to use such funds productively. In an
economy in which saving and real investment in capital goods are not
necessarily performed by the same units, the investment banking
operation is an essential part of the capital market.
Prior to 1948, underwriting activities in Japan were performed by
very few banks and trust companies. The system was modeled after
that of Germany, where it still is the custom to request a single bank
to head an underwriting syndicate when stockholders approve a new
securities issue. The underwriting syndicate is then charged with the
duty of distributing the new shares at the price determined by the
shareholders." 5
Under the Japanese Securities Exchange Law, banks and trust
companies may not engage in any securities business, except to buy or
sell securities for the account of a customer, or to buy or sell securities
for their own investment purposes.10 6 Banks may engage in underwriting only for bonds issued by the Government, or for bonds whose
interest payments are guaranteed by the Government. This exclusion
of banks and trust companies from all other investment banking
10 7
functions is modeled after the situation in the United States.
105. See THE PRINCIPAL

EXCHANGES

OPERATION, STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT

OF

THE WORLD-THEIR

135 (D. Spray ed. 1964).

106. Securities Exchange Law art. 65.
107. T. ADAMS, supra note 3, at 112. The reason why occupation authorities
denied banks and trust companies the right to engage in underwriting corporate
securities was that they felt that the essentially risky business of underwriting
corporate securities was not consistent with the fiduciary nature of the business of
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Investment banking functions in the distribution of new issues of
securities (other than government obligations) are now performed by
securities firms, although such firms do not confine their activities
exclusively to investment banking.
The principal activities of investment banking firms in Japan (as in
the United States) include origination, underwriting and distribution
of new securities. "Origination" means the initiation and completion
of negotiations between an issuing company and one or more
investment banking firms preliminary to the sale or distribution of a
new issue. Origination thus includes the advice, policy decisions and
mechanics entailed in the development and disclosure of the required
information and in the specification of the type of security, the terms
of the offering and the nature of the subsequent underwriting and
distribution. Two different methods exist for underwriting.'
Under
one, the investment banking firm or group buys the issue outright,
agreeing to pay on a specified date. Under the other, the investment
banking firm or group guarantees the sale of the issue by agreeing to
purchase it if the issue is not sold when offered to the public. The
latter method is the more common procedure in Japan, and without
exception bonds are underwritten in this way. Distribution relates to
the ultimate selling activities of the investment banking firms. In this
process, investment banking firms may be called on to provide expert
financial advice both to the issuers and, to some extent, to the public
purchasers of the new issue.
The investment banking procedures of Japan and the United States
are quite similar. There are, however, some minor differences. For
banks and trust banks. The function of a bank was, in their opinion, to lend

money for financing the short-term needs of industry. In the United States, banks
usually lend money for financing the short-term needs of industry, but this is not
the case in Japan. In Japan there are so-called long-term credit banks such as the
Industrial Bank of Japan and the Long-Term Credit Bank of Japan. Although the
latter bank was established after the War, the former has been engaged in
long-term financing for more than 70 years. If the prohibition of underwriting by
banks is only for the purpose of confining bank activities to lending money for
financing the short-term needs of industry, no reason exists for prohibiting
"long-term credit banks" from underwriting. Furthermore, the fiduciary nature of
the banking business in Japan is not the same as that of banks in the United
States. Banks in Japan are allowed to purchase securities, including common
stock, for their own accounts, and this practice is quite common. This is a great
contrast to the banking operations in the United States. Since purchasing common
stocks for purposes of investment is considered consistent with the fiduciary
nature of banking business in Japan, it is difficult to see why engaging in
underwriting activities is not equally consistent.
108. COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 301, 302.
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example, in the United States one or a few firms engage in the
originations, while a much greater number participate in the underwriting function and still more join in the distribution activities.
Moreover, underwriting syndicates frequently sell securities to distributors (dealers) who resell them to public purchasers. Rarely does a
syndicate sell all of the securities directly to the investing public. In
Japan the number of participants in the investment banking process
does not increase as the process advances, and the division of
investment banking functions is not as systematic. Underwriting
participants act as wholesalers and also as retailers since they sell most
of the securities to their own clients or directly to the investing public.
Investment banking operations involve substantial risk. The efficiency
of the investment banking functions would be increased if the risk and
selling effort could be appropriately diversified among the parties
concerned. In the United States, the number of participants in a
syndicate is large, especially for large issues, and the underwriting
function is separate from the dealer function; thus the risk and selling
effort are dispersed among a relatively large number of banking firms.
This is not the case in Japan.
IV.

REGULATION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF SECURITIES

A.

Regulatory Structure

The Securities Exchange Law in Japan was enacted as a condition
imposed by the occupation authorities for the reopening of the
securities exchanges. The Japanese law is a modified version of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 of the
United States and contains provisions substantially similar to those
found in the United States laws for the disclosure of corporate
information and for the regulation of the securities markets. However,
the pattern of securities regulation in Japan differs somewhat from
that of the United States since the Commercial Code also contains
disclosure and regulatory provisions. That regulatory provisions in
Japan emerged from these two different sources has had a substantial
influence on the regulatory mechanism.
In Japan the supervision of the securities markets is entrusted to
the Ministry of Finance, which exercises its control through the
Ministry's Securities Division. The Securities Division exercises executive, quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers similar to those of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States.
Disclosure of corporate information through the registration
system is required when securities are to be sold to the public.' 9
109. Securities Exchange Law art. 4.
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Public corporate securities issues are generally subject to the law, but
all bond issues, bank securities and small issues under 100 million yen
(approximately 0.33 million dollars) are exempted from the requirement.11
Registration statements must contain adequate information
for the benefit of the investors.111 If the Ministry of Finance finds
that a registration statement includes false information, fails to
include information covering important matters or is misleading, it
may deny registration. 2 Before a formal "stop order" is issued,
however, the company is entitled to a hearing at which it may present
clarifying information and amend its registration statement.11 3 If the
Ministry of Finance deems the amendment appropriate and satisfactory, it proceeds to register the issue.114 Not until registration is
completed may the securities be issued to the public.11
The Law also
requires that a prospectus containing essentially the same information
as the registration statement be presented to every subscriber of the
corporate issue. 16 All information that the Ministry of Finance
deems essential and appropriate to the public interest, or for the
protection of investors, must be included in the prospectus. 117 The
Ministry of Finance also has authority to regulate the trading of
securities, and to study and investigate matters in the public interest in
the entire field of securities issuance and trading. The Ministry may
investigate securities dealers, 1 8 securities exchanges,1 19 securities
dealers associations, 2 0 issuing companies and companies submitting
securities reports. 1 2 1 It may examine corporate books, require submission of reports on business or property and require the attendance
of witnesses.'
On the application of the Ministry of Finance, courts
may order any person engaged or about to engage in any act violative

110. Regulation Concerning Registration of Offers and Sales of Securities,
Ministry of Finance, No. 32, art. 1 (1972) (Japan). This regulation was
promulgated pursuant to the 1972 amendments in the Securities Exchange Law.
111. Securities Exchange Law art. 5.
112. Securities Exchange Law art. 10.
113. Securities Exchange Law art. 10.
114. Securities Exchange Law art. 10.
115. Securities Exchange Law art. 11.
116. Securities Exchange Law art. 13.
117. Securities Exchange Law art. 13.
118. Securities Exchange Law art. 55.
119. Securities Exchange Law art. 154.
120. Securities Exchange Law art. 76.
121. Securities Exchange Law art. 26.
122. Securities Exchange Law arts. 182-84, 186.
123. Securities Exchange Law art. 187.
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of the law to cease such action. 12 3 Through its quasi-legislative powers,
the Ministry of Finance may specify auditing standards for the certification of public accountants.' 2 4 It also has authority to regulate insider trading 2 ' and the solicitation of proxies. 2 6
The Securities Division of the Ministry of Finance has a staff of
about 140 and is composed of six sections. The General Administrative Section handles general policy-making and pricing problems.
Licensing problems are delegated to the Securities Operation Section.
Inspection of the general business and financial condition of securities
investment trust management is assigned to the Investment Trust
Section. The Securities Inspection Section is in charge of making
inspections of securities exchanges and securities financing companies.
The reviewing and scrutinizing of financial statements is assigned to the
Corporate Finance Section. The Capital Market Section, which is in
charge of investigating and policy-making for new issue markets, was
added in 1972.
A crucial difference between regulatory agencies in the United
States and in Japan exists in their status as institutions. In the United
States the SEC is an independent regulatory agency, and it functions
outside the three traditional branches of the federal system.' 2 7 In
Japan the Securities Division of the Ministry of Finance is a
component of the executive branch of the Government. This was not
the case at its inception. Originally, a Securities Exchange Commission
was created by the Securities Exchange Law to serve as an
independent agency distinct from the Ministry of Finance. The three
Commissioners were to be appointed by the Prime Minister and could
not be dismissed except for cause. In August 1951, however, as a
result of manpower problems, the Securities Exchange Commission
was abolished and its staff and functions absorbed into the Ministry of
Finance. This conversion was not considered substantially important,
since the Securities Exchange Commission had recruited its staff from
the Ministry of Finance, and the Commission and its staff for
administrative purposes were within the framework of the Ministry of
Finance. That the Ministry of Finance is a component of the executive
branch means that there is greater danger that its decisions can be
influenced by political pressure from other government branches.

124. Securities Exchange Law art. 193(2).
125. Securities Exchange Law art. 189.
126. Securities Exchange Law art. 194.
127. For a discussion of the independent character of such regulatory
commissions in the federal government scheme see Humphrey's Executor v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1934).
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Although there is no evidence that such pressure has actually been
brought to bear in the Ministry of Finance, the potential for such
abuse is present.
When securities are to be sold to the public, the principal
protection afforded investors is the disclosure of information through
the registration process at the Ministry of Finance. The functioning
and efficacy of this disclosure system depends on the ability of the
regulatory agency to examine intelligently the information contained
in the registration statement. In Japan the real problem was whether
an independent agency or a component of the executive branch could
hire the more competent men. It is reported that the SEC in the
United States has consistently been able to attract able and dedicated
public servants.12
In Japan it was difficult for an independent
agency to appeal to such persons to the same degree as could a more
prestigious branch of the Government. Thus it is generally agreed that
the change in authority to the Ministry of Finance has resulted in a
better staff that now enjoys enhanced status.' 2 9

128. Cary, Administrative Agencies and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 653 (1964).

129. There continues to be criticism, however, of the staff of the Ministry of
Finance. Regulatory work in this field requires a specialized knowledge of
corporate finance and accounting, and the staff of the Ministry of Finance is
criticized for being too legal-minded. This is probably due to the educational
training of the personnel the Ministry attracts. The orthodox training of lawyers
begins early and is concentrated overwhelmingly in one academic institution:
Tokyo University. Ambitious young men congregate in the law school of this
university for the purpose of acquiring a highly technical legal education. In order
to pass the national civil service examinations, they must spend most of their time
memorizing the Six Codes (RoppS) (Constitution, Civil Code, Criminal Code,
Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure), to the practical
exclusion of courses in economics and business administration. Thus they enter
government service trained as legal technicians with the rigid ideology of
bureaucracy. Although few would deny that the staffs of the Ministry of Finance
are composed of learned men, their backgrounds are definitely legalistic: they
relate all administrative decisions to laws, codes and regulations. It is significant
that no course in Securities Regulation is offered at the Tokyo University Law
School, the best law school in Japan. In addition, personnel rotation in the
divisions of the Ministry of Finance does not guarantee that the Securities
Division will always receive men with the needed special training. For the details
of bureaucratic aspects of the Japanese Government see K. TsuJi, NIHON
KANRYOSEI
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(Kobundo 1952).
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B. RegistrationRequirements
Under the Japanese Securities Exchange Law, the following are
classified as securities: government bonds, local government bonds,
bonds issued by a juridical person established under a special law,
stocks, certificates representing the right to subscribe to stocks to be
issued, beneficiary certificates of a securities investment trust or loan
trust, securities or certificates issued by foreign countries or foreign
juridical persons and such other securities or certificates as may be
prescribed by Cabinet Order.1 3
Unlike the more comprehensive
provisions in the United States securities acts, the provisions do not
apply to securities issued by natural persons, partnerships, committees
and trusts. 131
Under the Japanese Securities Exchange Law an issue with a total
face value not exceeding 100 million yen (approximately 333,000
dollars) is exempted from registration requirements. 132 Also exempted are government bonds, local government bonds, bonds issued by a
juridical person established under a special law and securities or
certificates issued by foreign countries or foreign juridical persons.
An important difference between the exemption provisions in
Japan and those in the United States and other countries with security
laws is that in Japan all bonds, both those secured with property and
those guaranteed, are exempted from registration. 1 33 The arguments
given for denying to purchasers of bonds the protection of the
Securities Exchange Law are as follows: first, that the main
purchasers of bonds have been financial institutions capable of
investigating the financial condition of the issuing companies; secondly, that almost all of the companies issuing bonds are listed companies
so that information concerning the issuing company is available,
thirdly, that disclosure of financial information about a company is
less essential to bondholders than to stockholders since the former are
secured by liens on specific company properties. 1 34 These liens are
said to offer bondholders sufficient protection in the event of

130. Securities Exchange Law art. 2.
131. Securities Act of 1933 § § 2(1), 2(2), 15 U.S.C.§ § 77(b)(1),77(b)(2)
(1970).
132. This compares to United States law prior to 1970 that exempted issues
having an offering price less than $300,000. This exemption was raised recently to
$500,000. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1964), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970).
133. Law No. 240 of June, 1951, Concerning Supplementary Provisions of
the Securities Exchange Law art. 7 (Japan).

134. 0. KAN, KAISEI SHOKENTORIHIKIH5 (REVISED SECURITIES
EXCHANGE LAW) 23-24 (Minato Shuppangassakusha 1954).
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financial difficulties. Probably, however, the real reason for exempting
bond issues from registration is that the buying and selling that does
occur in the relatively undeveloped bond market is done by
institutions who are not in need of the added protection. It is
uncertain whether this fact justifies the exemption.
Another exemption in Japan that is not found in the United States
arises from the different structure of the corporate laws in the two
countries. In the United States closely held companies are incorporated under the same corporate statute as are publicly held
companies. In Japan companies are divided into "closely held" and
"publicly held," and different sets of statutes, decrees and codes
apply to each. For regulatory purposes, the two are distinguished in
the United States by the manner in which the securities are sold. A
company that offers securities to the public (interstate or through the
mail) and does not have an available exemption is subject to the
securities laws and to the regulatory powers of the SEC. Mere
nonnegotiability of securities does not provide an exemption. Under
the Japanese laws, companies may choose between two types of
corporate form, each having regulatory requirements established by
statute. The two corporate forms are a limited liability company
(yugen kaisha) and a stock company (kabushiki gaisha). Only a stock
company, which is comparable to the general corporation in the
United States, may issue and sell securities to the public. A limited
liability company, under the Limited Liability Company Act 13 is
not authorized to issue negotiable securities,13 6 and thus does not
have recourse to the public market for the placement of its securities.
Since the limited liability company does not sell securities on the
market, it is not subject to the Securities Exchange Law and is not
required to disclose information. The theory is that the limited
liability company should have a simplified structure to permit a small
number of investors to avoid the elaborate stock company laws and to
avoid disclosing significant information during the company's forma37
1

tive years.

As we have seen, rights offerings are an ingrained custom in Japan.
It is problematic whether registration of rights offerings is legally
required under the Securities Exchange Law of Japan. The overall
question is whether rights offerings are "public offerings." A company
135. Law No. 74 of 1938, Limited Liability Company Act (Japan).
136. Law No. 74 of 1938, Limited Liability Company Act art. 21 (Japan).
137. There are two other corporate forms permitted under the Japanese
Commercial Code (arts. 62-164). They are a commercial partnership (gtrmeikaisha) and a limited partnership (g&shi-kaisha), neither of which has recourse to
the public market for the placement of shares.
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planning "to invite subscription to securities" must register the stock
issue. An invitation of subscriptions is defined to be any offer to sell
or solicitation of an offer to buy securities already issued to "many
and unspecific persons."' 33 Thus if stockholders are considered to be
"many and unspecific persons," registration is required in rights
offerings. If not, registration is not required. In practice, rights
offerings are usually registered, but there has been much disagreement
on the matter. One position maintains that stockholders are specific
and thus registration is not required for rights offerings.' 3 9 The
opposite position holds that stockholders are always changing and,
therefore, not specific.14 Since most offerings are rights offerings,
almost no registrations would be required in connection with capital
increases if one takes the former position. The practice of requiring
registration is sound. There is no compelling reason for regarding
stockholders as different from ordinary investors. Stockholders, as
such, have no advantage over ordinary investors with respect to
corporate information. The purpose of the registration requirement in
connection with rights offerings is to provide full and truthful
information to the stockholders who will be exercising the rights.
Neither is there adequate authority on the question of what
constitutes a "public offering." In the United States the determination
whether a particular transaction involves a public offering depends not
on any one factor but on all the surrounding circumstances. The
important criterion is whether the offerees may need the protection of
registration. 141 In Japan, however, it is generally agreed that the
number of offerees is a rather important criterion; generally, an
offering to fewer than 50 persons is not a public offering. The "fifty
offerees" rule of thumb is applied to the number of ultimate offerees
in case of secondary offerings. Therefore, registration is required for a
resale that finally involves more than 50 persons, even though the
number of initial offerees is fewer than 50 persons.
C. Disclosure Required for Offerings of Securities
Prior to the enactment of the Securities Exchange Law in 1948, the
Commercial Code was the only law that regulated security issues in
138. Securities Exchange Law art. 2(3).
139. Yoshida, Yiikansh~ken Todokedeseido no Kaizen ni tsuite (The Reform
of the Registration System), in SHOJi H5Mu KENKYU (LEGAL STUDIES IN
CORPORATE AFFAIRS)

2-4 (No. 85, 1957).

140. Yazawa, Mokuromisho no Kaisei Mondai (The Reform of the Prospectus
System),

in SHujI HSmu KENKYU

(LEGAL

STUDIES

2-8 (No. 81, 1957).
141. Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
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Japan. Even though Japan now has its Securities Exchange Law, all
companies except limited liability companies still must comply with
the requirements of the Commercial Code.
Under the Commercial Code, a corporation must publish its articles
of association at the time of incorporation in the official Gazette or in
a daily newspaper.14 2 The articles of association must contain the
object of the corporation, the trade name, the total number of the
authorized shares, the amount of par value shares, the total number of
shares to be issued at the time of incorporation, the minimum issue
price of no-par value shares, the seat of the principal office, the
manner in which the company is to give public notices and the full
name and permanent address of each promoter. 4 3 The Code also
prescribes the contents of subscription forms to be used when a new
issue is offered."
This form, prepared by the promoters, must state
the number of shares in each class of stock, a statement whether
shares subscribed by each promoter are par or no-par, their class, the
number and price at which such shares are being subscribed, the bank
or trust company that is to receive the payments and a statement that
a subscription for shares may be rescinded in the event the constituent
general meeting 145 is not terminated by a fixed date.
The disclosure requirements of the Commercial Code are insufficient for investor protection, and the Securities Exchange Law is a
great advance in requiring publicity and in supplying some details
concerning publicly held companies whose securities do not meet the
requirements of "exempted securities" or "exempted transactions."
Under the Japanese Securities Exchange Law the disclosure
mechanism is the registration statement filed with the Ministry of
Finance and the prospectus that summarizes the more detailed
registration statement. A registration statement becomes effective on
the 30th day after it is filed or on the 30th day after the filing of an
amendment, during which period the Ministry of Finance reviews the
statement and determines whether full and fair disclosure has been set

142. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 166.
143. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 166.
144. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 175.
145. If the shares are to be exchanged for property, the court appoints an
inspector to investigate whether delivery of the property has been effected
properly (art. 173). At the constituent general meeting, directors and auditors are
appointed (art. 183). The directors and auditors investigate whether all the

completed procedures meet the statutory requirements and report to the
constituent general meeting (art. 184). After all the stock has been subscribed,
registration of the incorporation is effected at the registry office (art. 188).
Spring, 1973

SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN

forth. 1"
While the Ministry of Finance examines registration
statements, it does not guarantee the security or approve or
disapprove of it. The law requires that sufficient and truthful facts for
investor judgment be made available to the public. The ultimate
responsibility for adequate and accurate disclosure belongs to the
issuer.' 4 7 In the event of a deficiency, amendments to the statements
are required, in which case the registration statement becomes
effective on the date of the lapse of the period designated by the
Ministry of Finance. 4 ' This interval enables underwriters, prospective purchasers and other interested parties to familiarize themselves
with the nature of the offering. The criteria for determining the
essentiality of the required information are provided by a Ministry of
Finance ordinance. 1 49 On or after the effective date, the registered
securities may be offered to the public, but each purchaser must
receive a prospectus at or before the sale or delivery of the securities,
or at the time of confirmation of his purchase.' 0 Offers using a
temporary prospectus during the waiting period that precedes the
effective date, however, are permitted.' s
D.

FinancialInformation and Accounting Practices

A comparison between the information required in the typical S-1
registration statement in the United States and that required by
Japanese registration statements discloses that the information contained in the latter is more comprehensive. Although there is not
much difference in the nonfinancial information such as "Description
of Business," "Plan of Distribution" and "Treatment of Proceeds
from Stocks Being Registered," the information included in the
financial statements is quite different. Japanese Securities Reports
submitted (usually twice a year) to the Ministry of Finance include
special items such as "specifications of holding securities" (securities
held by the company for temporary or long-term investment),
"current term changes in each reserves," and "breakdown of deprecia-

146. Securities Exchange Law art. 8. The effective date may be accelerated
by order of the Ministry of Finance, however, if information about the issuer is
adequately available for the protection of investors.
147. Securities Exchange Law arts. 16-18.
148. Securities Exchange Law art. 9.
149. Securities Exchange Law art. 5, which provides that matters necessary
and appropriate for the protection of public interest or investors are prescribed by
a Ministry of Finance ordinance. See note 154 infra.
150. Securities Exchange Law art. 15.
151. Securities Exchange Law art. 15.
Vol. 6-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

tions," l5 2none of which is disclosed periodically in the United
States.
Accounting regulations in Japan also come from both the Commercial Code and the Securities Exchange Law. This duality of
accounting regulations is due to historical developments. The Commercial Code regulates corporate accounting procedures i s3 for the
primary purpose of accurately determining the amount available for
dividends, so that the position of creditors will not be jeopardized via
an impairment of corporate properties from excessive dividend
distributions. In 1950, pursuant to the Securities Exchange Law,
"Regulations Concerning Terminology, Forms and Method of Preparation of Financial Statements" were promulgated ("Ministry of
Finance Ordinance"). 5 4 Then, in 1963, a separate set of regulations,
"Regulations Concerning Balance Sheet and Income Statements of
Corporations" ("Ministry of Justice Ordinance"),'
was issued to
complement the accounting regulations specified in the Commercial
Code. The Ministry of Justice Ordinance is applicable to all companies
under the control of the Commercial Code.
The accounting regulations are probably more sophisticated than in
any other country including, in some respects, the United States.
Unfortunately, serious problems arise in Japan because of discrepancies between the dual accounting regulations. The nature and
detail of the regulations and problems created by the dual system can
be seen in a few examples: first, consistency of accounting methods;
and secondly, equity structure requirements. The Ministry of Finance
Ordinance clearly provides for consistency over time regarding matters
of content and format in financial statements,"5 6 but the Ministry of
Justice Ordinance permits changes in accounting methods providing
that the changes are noted in a footnote.'
Under the provisions of
the Ministry of Justice Ordinance, furthermore, two opposite views
are possible. One is that the footnote is required in order to maintain
consistency. The other is that, although consistency does not permit
152. For a listing of items that are contained in the computer data files on
Japanese companies, of one of the major banks in Japan, see the Appendix. All
this information can be compiled from the Securities Reports.
153.

COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 281-95.

154. Japan, Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 18 (Sept. 28, 1950), as

amended, Japan, Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 59 (Nov. 27, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as Ministry of Finance Ordinance].

155. Japan, Ministry of Justice Ordinance No. 31 (March 30, 1963)
[hereinafter cited as Ministry of Justice Ordinance].
156. Ministry of Finance Ordinance art. 7.
157. Ministry of Justice Ordinance art. 3.
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changes of accounting method without due reason, the Ministry of
Justice Ordinance may permit such changes, even without due cause,
if a footnote is added.
The question of consistency is also confused in
15 8
the United States.
Under the Commercial Code, companies must set aside in each
period, in an earned surplus reserve, at least one-tenth of the profits
subject to cash dividends until this earned surplus reserve reaches
one-fourth of their capital.15 9 Companies also must set aside in a
capital surplus reserve funds derived from such sources as the issuance
of par value stock at prices above par.'6 0 Based on these reserve
requirements (earned surplus and earned capital surplus reserve), the
Ministry of Justice Ordinance provides that capital accounts must be
divided into statutory reserves (earned surplus reserve and capital
surplus reserve) and surplus. 61 The statutory reserves may not be
disposed of except to repair deficiencies in capital or as a transfer to
62
capital. 1
The Ministry of Finance Ordinance adopted the concept of capital
surplus prescribed in the Commercial Code,' 63 but added revaluation
reserves resulting from the Assets Revaluation Law' 64 and "other
capital reserves," which can be an arbitrary reserve and is disposable. 16 1 "Surplus," as defined in the Ministry of Finance Ordinance,
includes earned surplus reserves prescribed by the Commercial
Code, 66 voluntary reserves and unappropriated profit surplus or
undisposed loss for the period.' 6 ' Thus earned surplus, other than
158. In the United States, Regulation S-X provides that any change in
accounting principles or practices affecting comparability of financial statements
must be disclosed by a note in the appropriate financial statement. Therefore, it is
questionable whether Regulation S-X is based on the principle of consistency
specified by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. During the
past decade an average of 65 reports (11%) were found not to be consistent with

the preceding year. THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF CERTIFIED PUBLIC
ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNTING TRENDS AND TECHNIQUES

289 (20th ed.

1966). For a discussion of the consistency problem in the United States see Kell,
Auditor's Responsibilities in FinancialReporting, 19 MICE. Bus. REV. 29-30
(1967).

159. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 288.
160. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 288(2).
161. Ministry of Justice Ordinance art. 34.
162. COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 289, 293(3).
163. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 288(2).

164. Law No. 110 of 1950, Assets Revaluation Law, art. 102 (Japan).
165. Ministry of Finance Ordinance art. 63.
166. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 288.

167. Ministry of Finance Ordinance art. 65.
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earned surplus reserves prescribed by the Commercial Code, is
disposable. By comparison, SEC Regulation S-X in the United States
requires that separate captions be used to designate paid-in surplus,
surplus arising from revaluation of assets, and other capital surplus and
earned surplus (appropriated and unappropriated)."" 8 The effect of
Regulation S-X is thus almost the same as that of the Ministry of
Finance Ordinance, except that Regulation S-X contains no concept
equivalent to "statutory reserves" in the Commercial Code in
16 9
Japan.

Consolidated financial statements are not required by any accounting regulations in Japan. The Ministry of Justice Ordinance requires,
however, that stocks of subsidiary or affiliated companies be listed by
that title in the investment section.17
In the Ministry of Justice
Ordinance, a "subsidiary company" is defined as one in which 50 per
cent or more of its stock is held by the parent company. 1"'
The
Securities Exchange Law requires that the financial statements of an
"important subsidiary company" be attached to the securities report
of the parent company." 2
The Ministry of Finance Ordinance
definition of a "subsidiary company" is the same as that in the

168. SEC Reg. S-X, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3.01 (1972).
169. For income determination there exists some difference between the
American and Japanese practice. Under the Ministry of Justice Ordinance, the
amount of retained earnings voluntarily reserved for a particular purpose must be
shown on the income statement as a special gain when no longer required for that
purpose. Ministry of Justice Ordinance arts. 37, 42. The result of this treatment,
based on the so-called "all-inclusive theory," is that income statements frequently
include amounts that previously have been included in periodic income. The
Ministry of Finance Ordinance adopts the so-called "current-performance theory"
so that this "drawn-out profit" is not included in the income statement.
Discussions of the merits of the all-inclusive theory versus those of the
current-performance theory also have occurred in the United States. The
Executive Committee of the American Institute of Accountants supports the
current-performance theory. Before 1950, the SEC had maintained a policy based
on the all-inclusive theory but assumed a conciliatory attitude toward the
current-performance theory in its Accounting Series Release issued in 1950.
Therefore, Regulation S-X as it now stands requires a statement of each item of
profit and loss not included in the determination of net income or loss. For a
discussion of the controversy between the SEC and CAIA see Accounting Series
Release No. 70 (Dec. 20, 1950).
170. Ministry of Justice Ordinance art. 23.
171. Ministry of Justice Ordinance art. 9.
172. Securities Exchange Law arts. 23, 24. See Ministry of Finance
Regulation of June 1, 1972, Concerning Registration of Offers and Sales of
Securities No. 32, art. 15 (Japan).
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Ministry of Justice Ordinance, but an "important subsidiary" is
defined as one whose assets or sales are large enough to have a great
effect on the financial situation of the parent company.1 73 Since
different information concerning a subsidiary is required by the two
ministries, what information is to be disclosed will depend on which
ordinance is followed. Although it is true that consolidated statements
are most useful to the board of directors and operating officials of the
controlling company, 174 such statements also have great significance
to stockholders of the dominating company, and it is generally
recognized that consolidated statements ought to be introduced into
Japan as soon as possible.171
Under the Securities Exchange Law of Japan, all financial
statements of issuing companies listed on a securities exchange and
filed in accordance with the provisions of the Law must be certified
by an independent public accountant.1 76 This requirement brought
about improvements in auditing practices in Japan, since under the
Commercial Code there was no requirement that auditors be independent and professional accountants. The only disqualification
contained in the Code was that auditors should not be directors or
employees of the company. 171 Under the Commercial Code, auditorship was in practice a sinecure, often used as a training ground for
young executives.
Competent accountants are considered a prerequisite to the
effectiveness of the disclosure mechanism. Although in Japan the
accounting regulations are sophisticated in their approach, the
accounting profession itself is not as well developed as that in England
or in the United States. Before the enactment of the Securities
Exchange Law, there was no profession in Japan equivalent to the
English "Chartered Accountant" or the American "Certified Public
Accountant." There was a body of "keirishi" (accountants) but it
included a great number of persons whose knowledge of accounting

173. Japan, Ministry of Finance Ordinance No. 32, art. 15 (June 1, 1971).
174. W. PATON & W. PATON, JR., CORPORATE ACCOUNTS AND
STATEMENTS 574 (1964).
175. The following caution should be noted: "The formation of such
statements, however, presents many opportunities for concealing rather than
revealing the truth. A poorly prepared consolidated statement may be misleading
and thus may be worse than nothing." THE SECURITIES MARKETS 589 (A.
Bernheim & M. Schneider eds. 1935).
176. Securities Exchange Law art. 193(2); Japan, Ministry of Finance
Ordinance, Ministerial Order Concerning the Certified Audit of Financial
Statements No. 12 (1957).
177. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 276.
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was at best elementary."' Since the Certified Public Accountants'
Law1 " -was passed in 1948, this profession has advanced greatly, but
to date it has not matched the progress made in the United States and
England."' 0 It has been noted that one of the reasons why Japanese
CPA's certify erroneous financial statements is that CPA's as individuals are too weak to oppose their clients by stating that the
financial statements are improper. 18 ' If this is so, then the status of
CPA's could be improved by establishing accounting partnerships.
These partnerships are now being introduced into Japan. Before this
could be accomplished, some modification of law was required to
make this new legal concept of "partnership" acceptable to Japanese
practice. Accordingly, the Certified Public Accountants' Law' 82 was
amended to allow the establishment of CPA partnerships as legal
entities under the control of the Ministry of Finance.18 3 This may be
the beginning of the strengthening of the accounting profession, but
the problem remains of making accountants realize the advantage to
the profession of establishing partnerships.

178. This group is probably responsible for the observation that financial
statements available to stockholders were "curiosities in obscurity and evasion."
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Report of the Mission on JapaneseCombines, in 14 FAR
EASTERN SERIES

26-27 (1946).

179. Law No. 103 of 1948 (Japan).
180. The following case throws some light on the underdevelopment of
accountancy in Japan. The Sanyo Steel Company, one of the largest in this
industry, went bankrupt in 1965. The proceedings revealed a long existing
window dressing of financial data by the company. This revelation caused the
Ministry of Finance to begin a careful inspection of the financial statements of
other companies that had already submitted financial statements to the Ministry.
Based on the findings of this investigation, the Ministry of Finance ordered
thirteen companies to revise financial statements already submitted. For four of

the companies, there were drastic changes of net profit that resulted from the
revisions (see Table 8 opposite). In each of these cases Japanese CPAs had certified
thes erroneous financial statements to be "proper" or "approximately proper."
Obviously, financial statements certified by incompetent accountants may be
more misleading than statements that are not certified since "certification" tends

to encourage investor reliance. The number of companies that "dress up" their
financial data is not decreasing. In 1970, the financial statements of 614
companies were carefully inspected and 48 were reported to have altered their

data (see Table 9 on page 492).

181. Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Japan Economic Journal), Jan. 12, 1967, at 5.
182. Law No. 103 of 1948 (Japan).
183.

MINISTRY

OF FINANCE,

OKURASHO

1966 NENBAN (ANNUAL REPORT-THE
73-78 (Kinyu Zaisi Jijyo Kenkyukai 1967).

SHOKENKYOKU

MINISTRY

NENPPO,

OF FINANCE,

1966)
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TABLE

491

8*

The Revised Net Profits of the Four Companies
in Japan
(unit: million yen)
Before
Revision

After
Revision

Difference

(A)

(B)

(B-A)

Kyokut6 Hogei Co.
Oct. 1961

502

295

-207

Oct. 1962

1

-2,411

-2,412

Oct. 1963

-22

-446

-424

Oct. 1964

520

717

217

Oct. 1965

768

768

0

Nitt6 Spinning Co.
April 1962

-107

-920

-813

Oct. 1962

-17

-1,182

-1,165

April 1963

150

-830

-980

Oct. 1963

288

-377

-665

April 1964

237

-126

-363

Oct. 1964

255

-153

-408

-2

-183

-181

March 1962

200

150

-50

Sept. 1962

151

52

-99

March 1963

150

77

-73

Sept. 1963

177

87

-100

March 1964

175

69

-106

Sept. 1964
March 1965

281
224

-528
-294

-809
-1,018

March 1962

566

290

-276

Sept. 1962

653

105

-548

March 1963

412

-181

-593

Sept. 1963

567

-285

-852

March 1964

587

308

-279

Sept. 1964

492

60

-432

March 1965
Sept. 1965

-221
11

-267
60

-46
-49

April 1965

Topy Industries Co.

Ricoh Co.

Note: The differences of dates are due to the differences of the accounting

periods of the companies.
*Source: Nihon Keizai Shinbun (Japan Economic Journal), Jan. 25, 1967, at 5.
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E. Regulation of Investment Trusts
The investment trust system has developed since the births of stock
investment trusts in 1951 and of bond investment trusts in 1961; the
total principal outstanding reached 1,371 billion yen (4.6 billion
dollars) in 1964 (see Table 10). Due to the sluggish market situation,
the principal outstanding, however, decreased after 1964 and slipped
to about 888 billion yen in 1968. Since then, it has been increasing
and reached the historical high of 2,122 billion yen (7.0 billion
dollars) in 1972.
There are three types of investment trusts in Japan. They are the
open-end type stock investment trusts, resembling mutual funds in the
United States; the unit type stock investment trusts; and the open-end
type bond investment trusts. All investment trusts in Japan are of the
contractual type. The corporation type popular in the United States
and in European countries does not exist in Japan. The prospect of
introducing the corporation type investment trust, however, is
currently provoking active debate.
The investment trust system in Japan is regulated by the Securities
Investment Trust Law.18 4 Under this law, the Ministry of Finance, as
the supervisory and regulatory power, is responsible for investor
protection. Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance is provided with

TABLE 9*

Window-Dressing in Securities Reports
1966

1967

1968

1969

1970

1971

2,332

2,349

2,357

2,395

2,458

2,580

127

2

76

194

614

172

52

2

32

23

48

12

No. of Companies that
Submitted Securities
Reports
No. of Companies
Carefully Inspected
No. of Companies that
Dressed up the Data

*Source:

MINISTRY

SHIRYOSHU

OF

FINANCE,

(MATERIALS

SH5KEN

CONCERNING

KANKEI

SHUY5

SECURITIES)

47

SANK5

(Okurash6

Shaken Kyoku 1973).
184. Law No. 198 of 1951, Securities Investment Trust Law (Japan)
[hereinafter cited as Securities Investment Trust Law]. This law was modeled
after the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § § 80a-1 to 80a-52
(1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § § 80a-1 to 80a-52 (1970).
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TABLE 10*

Investment Trusts
(unit: 100 million yen)
STOCK INVESTMENT TRUSTS

Year Established
1962

Redeemed
or

Principal

Cancelled

BOND HNESTMENT TRUSTS

Outstanding Established Cancelled

TOTAL

Principal

Principal

Outstanding Outstanding

3,471

2,433

11,306

838

1,072

1,327

12,633

1963 3,319
1964 3,302

2,921
3,390

11,704
11,616

1,099
1,223

711

1,715

13,419

848

2,090

13,706

1965
1966

1,968
2,041

3,921
3,696

9,663
8,008

1,207
874

1,101
750

2,196
2,320

11,859
10,328

1967

2,154

3,457

6,705

1,207

775

2,752

9,457

1968

2,318

3,869

5,154

2,109

1,134

3,726

8,880

1969

3,889

3,442

5,601

2,524

1,358

4,892

10,493

1970

3,434

1,718

7,317

2,590

1,646

5,836

13,153

1971

3,611

1,920

9,008

2,917

1,576

7,177

16,185

1972

6,256

2,860

12,404

3,383

1,742

8,818

21,22

*Source:

MINISTRY

SHIRYOSHU

OF

FINANCE,

SH6KEN

(MATERIALS CONCERNING

KANKEI

SECURITIES)

SHUYO

SANKO

154-55 (Okurash5

Sh5ken Kyoku 1973).

broad authority such as licensing the trustors, 8 8 canceling their
licenses, 186 demanding materials or reports relative to the trust and
inspecting the trust property or books and documents of the trust,
trustor or trustee.'
F.

Civil Liabilities

Under the Japanese Securities Exchange Law, there are three types
of civil liability in connection with securities transactions:' 8 8 liability
for violation of the registration or prospectus provisions; 89 liability
for general misstatements or omissions in connection with sales of
185. Article 4 of the Securities Investment Law provides that only a trustor

company that is a corporation capitalized at more than 50 million yen ($138,888)
may enter into a contract of securities investment trust. The same article provides
that the trustee must be a trust company or a bank doing trust business. Securities
Investment Trust Law art. 4.
186. Securities Investment Trust Law art. 7.
187. Securities Investment Trust Law art. 21.
188. Securities Exchange Law arts. 16-21.
189. Securities Exchange Law art. 16.
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securities; 9 ' and liability for misstatements or omissions in registration statements. 9 ' The statutory language of the Japanese Act is
modeled after the Securities Act of 1933 in the United States but is
not exactly the same. The Commercial Code of Japan also provides
civil liability. The result is a number of differences in the liability
provisions of the two countries.
As a practical matter, litigation as a means of enforcing disclosure
has proved to be completely ineffective in Japan. There have been no
reported cases of civil suits or of criminal prosecutions arising from
misstatements or omissions, although there have been some cases in
which the validity of the issuance of shares before registration with
the Ministry of Finance was at issue.' 9 2 The lack of litigation in this
area is due partially to the nature of Japanese people, who do not like
litigation. Settlements of disputes in Japan often have little or nothing
to do with the law as such but are
frequently effected completely
193
outside the formal court structure.
Lack of litigation in Japan may also be due to certain defects in the
civil liabilities system. In the United States, aside from the express
civil liability provisions in the securities acts under the implied
liability doctrine, the courts have held that violations of other
provisions of the federal securities laws give rise to liability for injuries
to those persons for whose protection the statutes are intended, even
in the absence of an express statutory remedy. 194 Japanese courts
have not been willing as yet to develop such implied liability. In an
important case, Japanese courts ruled that since there was no express
provision of civil liability, an issuance of shares before registration
with the Ministry of Finance is not void even if the issuance violates
the Securities Exchange Law. 9 ' An implied liability doctrine is
difficult to introduce because the Japanese legal system is based on
statutory law. Under this system, the doctrine of "legal safety,"
meaning that any act not clearly mentioned in the statute is outside
legal control, carries great weight.

190. Securities Exchange Law art. 17.
191. Securities Exchange Law art. 18.
192. See, e.g., Kawase v. Godo Shoken Kabushiki Kaisha (United Securities
Co.), 7 Kakyu Minshu 2625 (Tokyo High Court, Sept. 26, 1956).
193. For the problems of application and law enforcement in Japan see A.
BURKS, THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN

170-73 (2d ed. 1964).

194. See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1757-1804 (2d.
ed. 1961).
195. Kawase v. Godo Shoken Kabushiki Kaisha (United Securities Co.), 7
Kakyu Minshu 2625 (Tokyo High Court, Sept. 26, 1956).
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1. Liability for Violation of Registration or ProspectusProvisions

(Article 1 6).-The issuer, the seller, the underwriter and the securities
firm that offers to sell a security in violation of the registration
requirement or the prospectus requirements1 9 6 become liable to the
purchaser.19
This provision was modeled after section 12(1) of the
United States Securities Act of 1933.198 The liability is absolute; the
plaintiff need only allege and prove that the defendant was a seller,
that he failed to comply with either the registration or the prospectus
requirements and that the act of the defendant inflicted damage on
the plaintiff. A seller's intent and knowledge of the violation is
irrelevant. 199
In connection with article 16, it must be remembered that an offer
prior to the effective date of the registration statement was illegal in
Japan until quite recently. The lack of legitimation of "offers" during
the waiting period made "beating the gun" a problem. Underwriters in
Japan were convinced that it was essential to the fulfillment of their
function, at least if an underwriting was to be done with reasonable
safety, that they test the market before committing themselves.
Market testing was done orally and in reliance on a gentleman's word,
or as an offer in the usual contract sense. Underwriters were careful
not to make binding sales, but they and dealers solicited and accepted
"indications of interest" shortly after the registration statement was
filed and before it became effective. If the issue was attractive, dealers
gave "indications of interest" to the underwriters and then solicited
and accepted "indications of interest" from investors. The "indication
of interest" practice made the provision of Japanese law prohibiting

196. Securities Exchange Law art. 15.
197. Securities Exchange Law art. 16.
198. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1970).
199. There is a difference between the two countries in the liability of
dealers: In the United States, dealers are exempted from the liability after a lapse
of 40 days from the date on which the security was offered to the public.
Securities Act of 1933 § 4(s)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(3)(A) (1970). In Japan, the
period is three months (until the recent amendment, one year). Securities
Exchange Law art. 15.3(3). Thus a dealer in Japan has to expose himself to the
longer risk. Another difference is that the tender of the certificates as evidence, if
the plaintiff owns the securities, is not required under the Japanese law, although
it is required under American law. Securities Exchange Law art. 16; Securities Act
of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970). Further, there is a difference as to

the liability of controlling persons. Under the American law, every person who
(by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise) controls any person liable
for violation of a registration or prospectus provision is also liable jointly and
severally. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970).
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preeffective date offers quite meaningless. Reflecting this situation,
the law was amended so that offers can now be made legally during
the waiting period."2 '
2. Liability for General Misstatements or Omissions in Sales of
Securities (Article 17).-Any person who sells a security by means of a
prospectus or other representation that includes an untrue statement,
or that omits a material fact, is liable to the purchaser." 1 A defense
is available if the seller can prove that he did not know, and that in the
exercise of reasonable care he could not have known, of such untruth
or omission.20 2 This provision, modeled after section 12(2) of the
Securities Act of the United States,2" 3 applies to all sales of
securities, except exempted securities, even though unregistered and
even though the particular transaction is exempted from the registration requirement.
If a seller in Japan is the issuer or underwriter of a registered
security, there is some overlap of article 17 and article 18, which
provides for liability for misstatements or omissions in the registration
statement. But, in the orthodox distribution, as far as the ultimate
investor is concerned, article 17 is vital even when there is registration,
since the ordinary dealer, even if he is a member of the selling group, is
not covered by article 18.
A plaintiff must prove that there was a misrepresentation or
omission of fact, that he did not know of the misrepresentation or
omission and that he suffered damages because of the misrepresentation or omission. There is no definite answer to the question how a
seller satisfies the burden of proving "reasonable care" since as yet
there has been no legal case or administrative opinion on the matter.
3. Liability for Misstatements or Omissions in Registration Statements (Article 18).-If any part of an effective registration statement
contains a misstatement of a material fact or fails to include a fact
necessary to make statements not misleading, the issuer who filed such
registration statement is liable to compensate any person or persons
who acquired the securities and suffered damage. This provision does
not apply if the person who acquired the securities knew of such
untruth or omission at the time of the acquisition. 2" Article 18 was
modeled after section 11 of the United States Securities Act of
1933

.2"1 Until recently, however, there was an important difference

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Securities Exchange Law arts. 13, 15.
Securities Exchange Law art. 17.
Securities Exchange Law art. 17.
Securities Act of 1933 § 12(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
Securities Exchange Law art. 18.
Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
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in the extent of liability in the two countries since in the United
States all those who signed the registration statement, the directors at
the time of filing, and every accountant, engineer or appraiser who
certified any part of the registration statement, as well as all
underwriters, may be liable; under Japanese law, only the issuer or
notifier was liable.2" 6 The law was amended recently, however, so
that all these persons are also liable in Japan.2 0° The liability of these
persons is absolute and the burden of proof rests on the defendants to
show that there were, after reasonable investigation, reasonable
grounds to believe that the statements were true.
V. REGULATION OF TRADING

A.

Statutory Framework

The statutory framework for the licensing of stock exchanges and
brokers and the regulation of trading is similar to that in the United
States. All stock exchanges must obtain a license from the Ministry of
Finance. 08 The statute provides that the Ministry of Finance is to
investigate and determine whether such an exchange is in the public
interest or necessary and appropriate for the protection of investors."' 8 If an exchange fails to enforce the law or violates the law, the
Ministry of Finance has the power to cancel the registration of the
206. Securities Exchange Law art. 4. Before the amendment, the liability of
these persons was left to the Commercial Code or to the general tort rules of the
Civil Code. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 266(3); CIVIL CODE art. 709 (1896)
(Japan). Under the Commercial Code, if directors are guilty of wrongful intent or
of gross negligence in respect of the assumption of their duties, they are jointly
and severally liable for damages to third persons. This liability also applies when
material false statements have been made in application forms for shares or
debentures, or a prospectus, or when a false registration or public notice has been
made. In cases in which an act mentioned above has been done pursuant to a
resolution of the board of directors, the directors who assented to such resolution
are deemed to have done the act. COMMERCIAL CODE art. 266(2). In this case,
directors who have participated in the resolution but who did not express their
dissent in the minutes are presumed to have assented to such resolution.
COMMERCIAL CODE art. 266(3). Thus if directors can allege and prove that
they opposed the resolution they escape liability. The general tort rules of the
Civil Code apply to the liability of accountants, engineers, appraisers or
underwriters. A person who has intentionally or negligently violated the right of
another is bound to compensate for the resulting damages. In this case the
plaintiff has to prove "intention" or "negligence" by the defendants.
207. Securities Exchange Law art. 21.
208. Securities Exchange Law art. 81.
209. Securities Exchange Law art. 83.
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exchange, or to suspend all or any part of the exchange's activities for
a period not exceeding twelve months.21 0 In case the activities of an
exchange or of trading on an exchange are deemed to be harmful,
contrary to the public interest, or lacking in protection to investors,
the Ministry of Finance may suspend trading for a period not
exceeding ten days or, with the approval of the Cabinet, may suspend
all business for a period not exceeding 90 days.21
The Ministry also
is empowered to suspend trading of specific securities or to delist the
21
issue. 2
The functions of the Ministry of Finance cover registering securities
dealers and supervising their activities. No person other than a stock
company registered at the Ministry may engage in the securities
business.21
The liabilities of a dealer may not exceed twenty times
his net worth and a lower multiple may be prescribed by the Ministry
when it is appropriate and in the public interest for the protection of
investors.2 1 4 The Ministry of Finance may suspend or cancel a
registration if a dealer is not able to meet the specified standards.2 1
This authority, and a provision that gives customers a prior claim
against the business guaranty funds that every dealer must deposit, is
2 16
designed to protect the customers' funds.
Securities and funds of clients in the hands of dealers are protected
by a provision denying dealers the right to pledge customers' securities
unless the dealer has the written consent of the customers concerned
in a form prescribed by the Ministry of Finance Ordinance. 2 17 Even
then the dealer must not pledge such securities in an amount greater
than the credit extended to the customer.2 18
Provision is also made for self-regulation, and under the Securities
Exchange Law a securities dealers' association must be registered with
the Ministry of Finance. 21 9 The articles of the association must
contain provisions designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative
acts, to prevent unreasonable charges and excessive profits and to
punish members for violation of the laws or rules of the associations

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Securities Exchange
Securities Exchange
Securities Exchange
Securities Exchange
Securities Exchange
Securities Exchange
Securities Exchange
Securities Exchange
Securities Exchange
Securities Exchange

Law art. 155.
Law art. 155.
Law art. 119.
Law art. 28.
Law art. 34.
Law art. 35.
Law art. 41.
Lav art. 51.
Law art. 51.
Law art. 67.
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or for acts that are contrary to just and equitable principles of
transaction. 2 " After a hearing the Ministry of Finance may order
such changes in the articles of association and bylaws as it deems
necessary to protect investors. 2 1
The intention of the regulation is to rely to some extent on the
stock exchanges. All trading in listed securities must in principle be
conducted on the exchanges. Trading is conducted over the counter,
however, in odd-lot stocks and block transactions. The latter is
approved only when the quantity of orders is so large that trading on
the exchanges is undesirable for fear of causing a wild price
fluctuation. Curb market and time transactions are conducted in
transactions with distant dealers and with foreign residents. The
over-the-counter market in Japan, however, handles only a marginal
portion of the stock transactions that take place in Japan and this
marginal function has been decreasing in recent years (see Table 11).

TABLE 11*

The Size of Over-the-Counter Stock Market
(unit: one million shares and one billion yen)

1967

1968

1969

1970

Maxket Transactions
Shares
Amount (yen)

84,317 (75.7%)
12,565 (76.5 %)

130,657 (77.9%)
23,340 (79.3%)

136,203 (94.7%)
36,967 (94.8%)

37,175 (22.1%)
6,105 (20.7%)

7,657 (5.3%)
2,011 (5.2%)

167,832 (100%)
29,445 (100%)

143,860 (100%)
38,978 (100%)

112,812 (94.6%)
23,794 (94.5%)

Over-the-Counter Transactions
Shares
27,013 (24.3%)
Amount (yen)
3,855 (23.5%)

6,486
1,396

(5.4%)
(5.5%)

Total
Shares
111,330 (100%)
Amount (yen) 16,420 (100%)

*Source:

STOCK EXCHANGE, SHOKEN NENKAN, 1971
BOOK, 1971) 232-52 (Tokyo Stock Exchange 1971).

TOKYO

TIES YEAR

220. Securities Exchange Law art. 71.
221. Securities Exchange Law art. 74.
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B. Restrictionson Broker-Dealers

Segregation of broker and dealer functions is not required, but
some regulatory provisions directed toward the problem exist in Japan
and were modeled after similar provisions in the United States. 2
One such provision makes it unlawful for any member of an exchange
who is both a dealer and a broker to effect any transaction in a
security unless he makes a written disclosure to his customer at or
before the completion of the transaction that he is acting as a dealer
for his own account or as a broker for one side or the other.223
Secondly, no member of an exchange can act both as a principal and
as an agent or broker at the same time in the same transaction.2 2 4
Thirdly, excessive transactions by a member of an exchange for his
own account are regulated by the administrative authority if they are
deemed detrimental to the public interest, to the protection of
investors or to the maintenance of an orderly market.2 2
In recent years around 30 per cent of the total sales by members of
the Tokyo Stock Exchange were traded for their own accounts (dealer
function) (see Table 12). The problems associated with the trading
activity of broker-dealers are somewhat different from similar prob-

222. A dealer sells securities that he has purchased elsewhere to his customer
or buys securities from his customer with a view to dispose of them elsewhere. He
receives no brokerage commission but relies for his compensation on the

difference between his buying and selling price. The risk of loss is entirely his
own. In each transaction he acts for his own account and not as agent for his
customer. On the other hand, a broker employed to execute an order for the
purchase or sale of securities is the agent of his customer. He does not undertake
to sell to or buy from his customer but rather to negotiate a contract of purchase
or sale between his client and a third party. The broker has no beneficial interest
in the transaction itself; his remuneration is derived from a commission received

for his services. The relationship between broker and customer is fiduciary in
nature; a broker is required to act solely for the benefit of his principal in all
matters connected with his agency.

If the broker and dealer functions are combined in one person, his own
interests may conflict with the interests of those to whom he owes a fiduciary
duty. In order to safeguard the investor from dangers of this type, segregation of
the broker and dealer functions has been proposed.
223. Securities Exchange Law art. 46; Securities Act of 1934 § 11(d)(2), 15
U.S.C. § 78k(d)(2) (1970).
224. Securities Exchange Law art. 47; New York Stock Exchange Rule 91, in
NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CONSTITUTION AND RULES (CCH 1968).

225. Securities Exchange Law art. 127; New York Stock Exchange Rules
108-110, in NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE CONSTITUTION AND RULES

(CCH 1968).
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TABLE

12*

The Composition of the Broker and Dealer Transactions
on the Japanese Stock Exchange
(unit: 100 million yen)
1967-1969
(Average)

1970

1971

1972

Broker Function
136,054 (63.0%)

221,319 (65.3%)

230,218 (65.0%)

338,188 (71.2%)

Dealer Function
79,801 (37.0%)

117,444 (34.7%)

123,948 (35.0%)

136,841 (28.8%)

Total

338,763 (100%)

354,166 (100%)

475,029 (100%)

*Source:

215,855 (100%)

MINISTRY

SHIRYOSHUJ

OF FINANCE,

(MATERIALS

SiHiKEN KANKEI SHUY5 SANK)

CONCERNING

SECURITIES)

136 (Okurash5

Sh6ken Kyoku 1973).

lems in the United States, where objections
have focused on the
'226 '
trading of "floor traders" and "specialists.
"Floor traders" who trade for their own account on the floor do
not exist in Japan. Furthermore, specialists such as those on the New
York Stock Exchange do not exist on the Japanese stock exchanges.
There is a somewhat similar type of member called a "nakadachi" who
acts as an intermediary between regular members in the execution of
orders on the floor,2 27 but these members do not trade for their own
accounts.
It is possible, however, to find situations in Japan in which a
conflict of interest between a broker-dealer and a customer exists to
the disadvantage of the customer. A broker who trades for his own
account often furnishes his customers with investment advice called
"suish6 hanbai" (the recommended sale). Securities firms have been
accused of secretly purchasing for their own account specific issues,
which they later recommend to their customers. As soon as they
announce their recommendation, they proceed to buy more of the
issue, thus forcing the price up. As a result, customers are forced to

226. SEC, REPORT ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF THE
COMPLETE SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF DEALER AND

BROKER 14-16 (1936).
227. For the difference between "nakadachi" and specialist see W. EITEMAN
& D. EITEMAN, supra note 62, at 64.

Vol. 6-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

purchase the stock at a higher price.22 Furthermore, it is argued that
the securities and credit balances of customers are often endangered
by the risks incurred by broker-dealers when they make excessive
commitments for their own accounts.2 2 9 Speculation may be
necessary and desirable to achieve a continuous market; however,
excessive speculation by broker-dealers, or even the opportunity to
engage in excessive speculation, is detrimental to the best interests of
the market.
While statutory provisions exist to provide minimum protection to
investors, they do not operate well in practice. For instance, although
members of an exchange are required to disclose to their customers at
or before the completion of a transaction whether they are acting as a
dealer or a broker,2 31 there is no provision calling for civil and
criminal sanctions against persons guilty of violating the provision.2 31
The lack of civil and criminal sanctions in Japan makes this disclosure
provision practically ineffective.
Secondly, although members of an exchange are prohibited from
acting both as a principal and as an agent at the same time in a single

transaction, the legitimacy of crossing transactions renders the
prohibition ineffective. Frequently, securities firms have both buying
and selling orders in similar amounts for the same issue. Rather than
execute separate contracts at greater cost to their customers, these
buying and selling orders are matched, with the security firms

generally serving as an agent for both customers. Sometimes the order
of a customeb is matched by an order of the security firm for its own
2 32
account. Crossing transactions are not illegal in themselves.

228. The mechanisms of "suisho hanbai" (the recommended sale) by big four
companies is clearly explained in Kawai, Sengo Keizai no Kozohenka to
Kabukahendo (The Structural Change in the Post-War Economy and the Stock
Price Fluctuations), in KEIZAI HENDO (EcoNOMIC JOURNAL) 91 (Feb.

1959).
229. NIHON SHOKENSHIJO NO Kozo BUNSEKI (A STUDY OF THE
JAPANESE SECURITIES MARKETS) 234 (Ichiro Kawai ed., Yuhikaku 1966).

The main cause for the financial difficulties of the Yamaichi Securities Company
is said to have been excessive commitments for its own account.
230. Securities Exchange Law art. 46.
231. By contrast, American law provides for civil actions and/or criminal
prosecutions against persons who violate the provision. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.
15c 1-4 (1972).
232. Before 1967, when members of an exchange had both buying and selling
orders in similar amounts for the same issue, the members were allowed to match
the buying and selling orders outside the exchange. This way of executing
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According to a Tokyo Stock Exchange rule, such transactions can be
consummated on the conditions that the transactions are advantageous and fair to customers and that the price determined is within a
reasonable range of the regular, quoted market price.23 3 These
protective provisions in the Tokyo Stock Exchange rule are almost
the same as those specified by the New York Stock Exchange rule
on the crossing of orders, but the latter is worded much more
precisely.2 3 4

C. Regulation Against Manipulation
Since the Japanese Securities Exchange Law is modeled after the
American Securities Exchange Act of 1934, there are many similarities
between the two countries with regard to regulations designed to
prohibit the manipulation of securities prices.2 3 1 Wash sales and
matched orders designed to create false and misleading impressions of
active trading are prohibited. 3 6 It is unlawful for dealers or brokers
or other persons selling or purchasing a security to make false or
misleading statements for the purpose of inducing a purchase or a sale

transactions was called "bai-kai" (sell-buy). The problem was serious in Japan
because a substantial proportion of trading on the exchange consisted of
"bak-kai" transactions. For example, in 1965, "bai-kai" transactions were
equivalent to 46% of the transactions executed on all the exchanges in Japan and
to 64% of the total transactions carried out on the Tokyo Stock Exchange by the
four largest securities firms (Nomura, Nikko, Daiwa and Yamaichi). Therefore,
"bai-kai" transactions, far from being exceptional, were the norm. In order to
correct this abuse, "bai-kai" transactions were prohibited in 1967 by an
administrative measure of the Ministry of Finance.
233. Tokyo Stock Exchange Rule of April 1, 1949, arts. 35, 36 (Japan).
234. Under New York Stock Exchange Rules, a broker who receives an order
to sell may himself buy the stock from his customer, provided (1) he shall have
offered the same in the open market at a price which is higher than his bid by the
minimum variation permitted in such securities, (2) the price is justified by the
condition of the market, and (3) the member who gave the order shall after
prompt notification accept the trade directly or through a broker authorized to
act for him. New York Stock Exchange Rule 91(b), in NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE CONSTITUTION AND RULES (CCH 1968). The converse rule
governs with respect to a member's supplying his own securities to meet a buy
order. Id. Rule 91(c).
235. Securities Exchange Law art. 125; Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9,
15 U.S.C. § 78i (1970).
236. Securities Exchange Law art. 125.1(1)-(3); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 9(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(3) (1970).
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of a security. 3 7 It is also unlawful for any person selling or
purchasing a security to induce the purchase or sale by the circulation
or dissemination of information that the price will rise or fall because
of the market operations of one or more persons. 2 38 It is equally
unlawful for any person to induce the purchase or sale of a security
for a consideration
received from any person selling or purchasing a
239
security.
A provision in the Japanese law not found in the United States
declares it to be unlawful for any person in the act of inviting
subscriptions, or engaged in any other transaction regarding a transfer
of securities, to directly or indirectly circulate false rumors or use
deceptive schemes, or employ threats of an assault and battery or
intimidation for the purpose of inducing fluctuation in the quotations of any security. 240 This provision originated in the old Japanese
Exchange Law24 1 rather than in the United States securities acts.
The Japanese Securities Exchange Law has equivalent fraud
provisions to those found in the United States except that there is no
language similar to the language in section 10b of the Securities
Exchange Act referring to any manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise
fraudulent device or contrivance. There are, however, specific provisions providing that at the time of inviting subscriptions, it is
unlawful for any person to suggest that he will rebuy the securities
sold or resell securities bought at a price previously specified or at a
237. Securities Exchange Law art. 125.2(3); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 9(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4) (1970). Here, there is a difference between the
two countries. Under the United States law it is unlawful to make a statement if
one knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that the statement is false or
misleading. But the clause "had reasonable ground to believe" is not found in the
Japanese law. Thus it is unlawful for Japanese brokers and/or dealers to make
statements only when they actually know that the statements are false or
misleading.
238. Securities Exchange Law art. 125.2(2); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 9(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(5) (1970). In the United States, manipulators may
be held responsible for the transactions of their friends, relatives, business
associates and others acting on tips and rumors traceable to the manipulators.
Since the provisions of the Act regarding prohibition of manipulation do not
contain explicit language to this effect, the interpretation rests on the common
law doctrine of "aider and abetter." By contrast, Japanese law provides that it is
unlawful to entrust or to be entrusted with manipulative acts, hence the
prohibition stems from the wording of the law itself. Securities Exchange Law art.
125.1(4). This was necessary since Japan is a civil law country without the
common law doctrine of "aider and abetter."
240. Securities Exchange Law art. 197.
241. Exchange Law No. 5 of March 4, 1893, art. 32(4).
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price above such price, or make any statement liable to be so
interpreted.24
It is also unlawful for any issuer of a security or for
any person selling a security by public offering, or for any officer,
adviser, counsellor, or employee to imply at the time of a public
offering that a specified amount of money can be obtained by
resale.24 3
In Japan, as in the United States, penal sanctions are present for
violation of the manipulation provisions.244 In addition, if a securities
dealer engages in a manipulative practice, the Ministry of Finance may
cancel his registration or may order suspension of the whole or any
part of his business. 2 45 Some provision is also made for civil liability
(equivalent to section 9(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of the
United States). 246 Recognizing that the most important measures
designed to prohibit manipulation should be preventive in nature, the
Securities Exchange Law of Japan provides that courts, on application
of the Ministry of Finance, may enjoin persons who engage in acts
violating the law. 2 47 As the premise of this preventive measure, the
Ministry of Finance is empowered to make necessary investigations, 248 a power also possessed by the SEC in the United States.2 49
Thus the structure of the antimanipulation provisions of the
Japanese Securities Exchange Law is much the same as the federal
securities acts in the United States. But the implementation of the
provisions in Japan is quite different from that in the United States. In
Japan there have been no legal cases involving civil liability arising
from manipulation and no criminal cases assigning a penalty. Also
there have been no cases in which a court on application of the
Ministry of Finance has entered an order prohibiting or suspending
manipulative acts. It is difficult to believe that there has never been
manipulation in the Japanese markets.
It is said that antimanipulation provisions in the United States have
been markedly effective.2"'
The SEC has expressed the belief that
manipulation is no longer an appreciable factor in American mark242. Securities Exchange Law art. 191(3).
243. Securities Exchange Law art. 191(4).
244. Securities Exchange Law arts. 197(2), 207.
245. Securities Exchange Law art. 59.
246. Securities Exchange Law art. 126.
247. Securities Exchange Law art. 187. This provision is modeled after
section 21(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in the United States. 15
U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1970).
248. Securities Exchange Law art. 183.
249. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1970).
250. L. Loss, supra note 194, at 1568.
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ets. 2 1' A large part of the Commission's success in this field has been
due to continual improvement in its procedures for the systematic
surveillance of the markets. The SEC's market surveillance staff, in
cooperation with major stock exchanges, studies tickertape quotations
of securities listed on the national exchanges, the sales and quotations
sheets of the various regional exchanges, and the bid and asked prices
of unlisted securities for unusual or unexpected price variations or for
signs of manipulative market activity. When no apparent explanation
can be found for an unusual movement in prices, the SEC is
empowered by law to conduct an investigation. 5 2 This investigation
may extend to every transaction in an issue executed during a month
or six weeks. The Ministry of Finance is empowered to do the
same,2" 3 but has not chosen to utilize its power.
Why has the Ministry of Finance not chosen to regulate manipulation? First, like other provisions of the law, the antimanipulation
provisions of the Japanese law were introduced by the United States.
Therefore, the provisions did not emerge from actually experienced
manipulation occurring in Japan. This fact weakens the feeling that it
is necessary to rigorously enforce the provisions. Secondly, the
Ministry of Finance is continually confronted with budget and staff
shortages. Therefore, it does not maintain the continuous surveillance
of trading necessary to discover manipulation. Thirdly, it is difficult to
prove intention to manipulate under the Japanese law. This is 'also a
problem in the United States, but the SEC takes the position that
since it is impossible to search the depths of a man's mind, findings of
manipulation can be supported by inferences drawn from circumstantial evidence. The American point of view holds that a motive to
manipulate prima facie establishes a manipulative purpose.2" 4
The most common type of manipulation found in Japanese markets
today involves a peculiar form of "corner" not a part of the current
American experience. An outsider may slowly and secretly accumulate
shares in the market. Then when he has enough shares to cause
management trouble, he offers to sell his shares to management at
higher than market prices, as a condition for not making trouble. This
is certainly a violation of the manipulation provision in the law,25 5
but manipulative intent in these cases typically has been quite difficult
to prove.
251. SEC, ANNUAL REPORT No. 16, at 37 (1950).
252. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1970).
253. Securities Exchange Law art. 133.
254. See, e.g., Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106, 124 (1949); Federal
Corp., 25 S.E.C. 227, 230 (1947).
255. Securities Exchange Law art. 125.2(1).
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D.

ContinuousDisclosures

The disclosure requirements under the Securities Exchange Law for
initial issues are extended to subsequent disclosures. 25 6 As in the
United States, issuers whose registrations have become effective must
file periodic and annual reports that include the same type of financial
statements as are contained in a registration statement. These periodic
reports filed with the Ministry of Finance are available for public
inspection. The periodic reports are just as extensive as those required
for a new registration statement, although this is not yet true in the
United States. Also, as indicated by the Appendix, the content of the
financial statements is more extensive than the content of those common in the United States.
E. Insider Trading
As to insider trading, Japanese law provides that for the purpose of
preventing any officer or major stockholder of a company from
availing himself of secret information obtained through his office or
position, the company may recover all profits made by the insider
from purchases of company stock made within six months after sale
or from a sale of company stock made within six months after
purchase.2" 7 No legal case involving insider trading, however, has been
reported in Japan. Since it is difficult to believe that there has never
been insider trading in Japan, it may safely be said that there, are
problems with the methods for enforcing this provision.

APPENDIX
DISCLOSURE ITEMS BY JAPANESE COMPANIES

The following information can be ascertained through examination of a typical
Japanese financial statement.
1. BALANCE SHEET (ASSETS): Current assets; quick assets; cash; trade
notes receivable; trade notes receivable from affiliated companies; trade accounts
receivable; trade accounts receivable from affiliated companies; marketable
securities; allowance for doubtful accounts; inventories; finished goods; merchandise inventories; semi-finished goods; work in process; raw materials; supplies;
other current assets; advances to suppliers; advances to affiliated companies;
prepaid expenses; other accounts receivable; other accounts receivable from
affiliated companies; accrued receivables; accrued receivables from affiliated
companies; short-term loans receivable; short-term loans to affiliated companies;
256. Securities Exchange Law arts. 24, 25.
257. Securities Exchange Law art. 189.
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advances in process of clearance; allowance for doubtful accounts; fixed assets;
property, plant and equipment; buildings; structures; machinery and equipment;
vessels and other water equipment; transportation equipment; tools, furniture and
fixtures; other property, plant and equpment; land; construction in progress;
intangible assets; industrial property rights; right to use facilities; other intangible
assets; investments; investment securities; investment in affiliated companies;
noncurrent trade accounts receivable; noncurrent receivables; noncurrent loans to
affiliated companies; investment property; other investments; allowance for
doubtful accounts; deferred charges; prepaid expenses expiring after one year;
organizational expenses; bond discounts and costs of stock and bond issues;
research and development expenses; deferred losses; total assets.
2.

BALANCE

SHEET

(LIABILITIES

AND

STOCKHOLDERS'

EQUITY):

Liabilities; current liabilities; trade notes payable; trade notes payable to affiliated
companies; notes payable on property purchase; trade accounts payable; trade
accounts payable to affiliated companies; short-term loans; short-term loans in
foreign currency; long-term debt payable within one year; long-term debt payable
within one year in foreign currency; bonds redeemable within one year; bonds
redeemable within one year in foreign currency; other accounts payable; accounts
payable to property purchases; accrued expenses; advances from customers; other
advances received; deposits received from employees; deferred income; unrealized
gross profit on installment sales; other current liabilities; accrued bonuses;
corporate income taxes payable; long-term liabilities; debentures; debentures in
foreign currency; long-term debt; long-term debt in foreign currency; long-term
notes payable; other long-term accounts payable; other long-term debt; accrued
retirement allowances; reserves; reserve for price decline; reserve for doubtful
accounts; reserve for special depreciation; reserve for excess of cost of property
over book value; reserve for special repairs and maintenance; reserve for return of
goods; reserve for loss from market development; reserve for loss from overseas
investment; other reserves; stockholders' equity; capital stock; capital stock
subscribed; capital surplus; statutory capital surplus; appraisal surplus; other
capital surplus; retained earnings; statutory reserve; appropriated retained earnings; unappropriated retained earnings; retained earnings at beginning of period,
less current appropriation; net increase in retained earnings; bonuses to officers
and dividends; discounted notes; discounted notes accepted from affiliated
companies; notes pledged as security; endorsed notes; contingent liabilities.
3. INCOME STATEMENT: Sales; gross sales; sales discount and returns; cost
of sales; inventories at beginning of period; cost of finished goods manufactured;
purchases of merchandise inventories; inventories at end of period; commodity
tax and other sales taxes; transfers-in and transfers-out and other inventory
adjustments; gross profit on sales; other operating revenues; net realized gross
profit on installment sales, and provision for possible returns; gross profit on sales
after adjustments; selling and administrative expenses; sales commissions; packing
and delivery expenses; advertisement expenses; other selling expenses; royalties;
provision for doubtful accounts; officers' remuneration; salaries and wages;
provision for retirement allowances; welfare; travel and communication; entertainment; depreciation; rent; taxes and dues; enterprise tax; research and development; other selling and administrative expenses; operating income; nonoperating
income; interest and dividend income; interest and dividends received from
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affiliated companies; interest on installment sales; gain on sales of assets; credit
from reversal of reserve for price declines; credit from reversal of allowance for
doubtful accounts; credit from reversal of allowance for special depreciation;
other nonoperating income; nonoperating expenses; interest and discounts;
amortization of bond discounts and issue costs; taxes and dues; loss on sales
and/or disposal of assets and loss on writedown of assets value; provision for price
declines; provision for doubtful accounts; provision for special depreciation;
special depreciation; other nonoperating expenses; net income before income
taxes and extraordinary items; extraordinary income; income from sales of fixed
assets; income from sales of investment securities; credit from reversal of reserve
for price declines; credit from reversal of reserve for special depreciations; credit
from reversal of other reserves; adjustment of prior periods' income; other
increases in retained earnings; return to retained earnings of earnings appropriated
for certain specific purposes; extraordinary charges; loss from disposal of fixed
assets; loss from devaluation and/or sales of securities; provision for price declines;
provision for special depreciation; special depreciation; provision for other
reserves; adjustment of prior periods' income; other decreases in retained earnings;
net income before income taxes; provision for income taxes; net income;
dividends; stock dividends; bonuses to officers; retained earnings; internal sales
included in sales; sales to affiliated companies included in sales.
4. STATEMENT OF COST OF GOODS MANUFACTURED: Cost of raw
materials used; beginning inventories of raw materials; purchases of raw materials;
ending inventories of raw materials; transfers-in and transfers-out and other
adjustments; labor costs; salaries and wages; provision for retirement allowance;
welfare; other manufacturing costs; subcontracting fees; electricity; gas and water;
factory supplies; freight; royalty; depreciation; repairs; insurance premiums; rent;
taxes and dues; travel and communication; other manufacturing expenses;
manufacturing costs; beginning inventories of work in process; ending inventories
of work in process; transfers-in, transfers-out and other adjustments; cost of
finished goods manufactured.
5. OTHER FINANCIAL AND OPERATING INFORMATION: (a) Status of
Capital: Par value of capital stock; total number of shares issued; average amount
of paid-in capital; percentage of shares held by financial institutions and
governmental bodies; percentage of shares held by foreign companies and
individuals; highest stock price during the current period; (b) Status of
Employees: Number of employees as of end of period; number of male workers;
average age of employees; average monthly salary for employees working at end of
period; (c) Audit Opinion; (d) Method of PricingInventories: Raw materials;
work in process; finished goods; (e) Detailsof Securities: (i) held for temporary
investment-Stock; government, local government and governmental corporation
bonds; (ii) held for long-term investment-Stock; government, local government
and governmental corporation bonds; (f) Increase and Decrease in Property,
Plant and Equipment: Increase in property, plant and equipment; decrease in
property, plant and equipment; decrease in construction in progress; (g) Details
of Depreciation and Amortization: Depreciation and amortization; special
depreciations; depreciation of property, plant and equipment; depreciation of
buildings; depreciation of structures; depreciation of machinery and equipment;
depreciation of vessels and other equipment; depreciation of transportation
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equipment; depreciation of tools, furniture and fixtures; depreciation of other
plant and equipment; amortization of intangible assets; amortization of investment property; amortization of deferred charges; accumulated depreciation and
amortization; accumulated depreciation of property, plant and equipment;
accumulated depreciation of buildings; accumulated depreciation of structures;
accumulated depreciation of machinery and equipment; accumulated depreciation
of vessels and other water equipment; accumulated depreciation of transportation
equipment; accumulated depreciation of tools, furniture and fixtures; accumulated depreciation of other plant and equipment; accumulated amortization of
intangible assets; accumulated depreciation of investment property; accumulated
amortization of deferred charges; depreciation method; (h) Changes in Bonds,
Long-term Debt and Capital Stock: Bonds issued during period; bonds redeemed
during period; convertible bonds outstanding; long-term debt incurred during
period; long-term debt repaid during period; capital stock issued for cash;
premiums of capital stock issued for cash; factors which give rise to changes in
capital; (i) Details of Reserves and Allowances: Increase in reserve for bonus;
decrease in reserve for bonus; increase in reserve for corporate income taxes;
decrease in reserve for corporate income taxes; amount paid out for decrease in
reserve for corporate income taxes; increase in reserve for retirement allowance;
decreases in reserve for retirement allowance; amount paid out for decrease in
reserve for retirement allowance; increase in reserve for price declines; decrease in
reserve for price declines; increase in reserve for doubtful accounts; decrease in
reserve for doubtful accounts; amount of offsets against receivables; increase in
reserve for special depreciation; decrease in reserve for special depreciation;
amount for assets retired; increase in reserve for excess of cost of property over
book value; decrease in reserve for excess of cost of property over book value;
increase in reserve for special repair and maintenance; decrease in reserve for
special repair and maintenance; increase in reserve for returns of goods; decrease
in reserve for returns of goods; increase in reserve for loss from overseas market
developments; decrease in reserve for loss from overseas market developments;
increase in reserve for loss from overseas investment; decrease in reserve for loss
from overseas investment; increase in other reserves; decrease in other reserves;
0) Details of Cash: Cash on hand; cash in banks--checking accounts; savings
accounts; deposits at call; time deposits; other deposits; (k) Others: Number of
months in operation; classification of information source; date of merger.
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